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A TRADITIONAL AND TEXTUALIST ANALYSIS 
OF THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST:  EFFICIENCY, 
PREVENTING THEFT FROM CONSUMERS, AND 
CONSUMER CHOICE 
Robert H. Lande* 
 
This Article ascertains the overall purpose of the antitrust statutes in two 
very different ways.  First, it performs a traditional analysis of the 
legislative history of the antitrust laws by analyzing relevant legislative 
debates and committee reports.  Second, it undertakes a textualist or “plain 
meaning” analysis of the purpose of the antitrust statutes, using Justice 
Scalia’s methodology.  It does this by analyzing the meaning of key terms as 
they were used in contemporary dictionaries, legal treatises, common law 
cases, and the earliest U.S. antitrust cases, and it does this in light of the 
history of the relevant times.  
Both approaches demonstrate that the overriding purpose of the antitrust 
statutes is to prevent firms from stealing from consumers by charging them 
supracompetitive prices.  When firms use their market power to raise prices 
to supracompetitive levels, purchasers pay more for their goods and 
services, and these overcharges constitute a taking of purchasers’ property.  
Economic efficiency was only a secondary concern.  In addition, the 
textualist approach leads to the surprising conclusion that neither the 
Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act contain an exception for monopolies 
attained by efficient business conduct.  A “plain meaning” analysis of the 
antitrust statutes reveals that they are supposed to prevent and condemn all 
privately created monopolies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article determines the overall purpose of the antitrust statutes in two 
very different ways.  First, it performs a traditional analysis of the 
legislative history of the antitrust laws by analyzing relevant legislative 
debates and committee reports.  Second, it undertakes a textualist or “plain 
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meaning” determination of the purpose of the antitrust statutes, using 
Justice Scalia’s methodology.  It does this by analyzing the meaning of key 
terms as they were used in contemporary dictionaries, legal treatises, 
common law cases, and the earliest U.S. antitrust cases, and it does this in 
light of the history of the times.   
Both approaches demonstrate that the overriding purpose of the antitrust 
statutes is to prevent firms from stealing from consumers by charging them 
supracompetitive prices.  When firms use their market power to raise prices 
to supracompetitive levels, consumers pay more for their goods and 
services, and these overcharges constitute a taking of consumers’ property.  
Economic efficiency was only a secondary concern.  In addition, the 
textualist approach leads to the surprising conclusion that neither the 
Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act contain an exception for monopolies 
attained through efficient business conduct.  A “plain meaning” analysis of 
the antitrust statutes concludes that they are supposed to prevent and 
condemn all privately created monopolies.   
The importance of this distinction can be illustrated by an extraordinary 
document that recently turned up:  the inaugural speech by the first candid 
efficiency purist to head either the Antitrust Division or the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC)!1  It says the following: 
 Today I’m announcing three important changes in enforcement 
priorities:  First, I’m going to permit most mergers to monopoly even if 
postmerger prices are likely to rise dramatically, so long as the merger is 
likely to lead to even a tiny cost savings.  For example, even a 10 percent 
price rise usually will be fine so long as costs fall by 1/4 of 1 percent.2 
 Second, I’m going to permit many cartels, even when firms fix prices 
or rig bids.3  I’ll be especially unlikely to prosecute cartels involving 
necessities, because demand tends to be highly inelastic and therefore 
unlikely to cause allocative inefficiency.4  For example, an insulin cartel 
 
 1. This is a hypothetical whose purpose is to illustrate some of the effects of an 
antitrust policy that is both candid and solely based upon the goal of maximizing economic 
efficiency. 
 2. See Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 387 tbl.1, 420 (1980).  For the origin of this approach to 
merger analysis, see generally Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense:  
The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); see also Alan A. Fisher, Frederick I. 
Johnson & Robert H. Lande, Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 777, 
809–13 (1989), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134826. 
 3. For explanations of bid-rigging scenarios that do not produce allocative 
inefficiencies and additional examples, see Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of 
Reason and the Goals of Antitrust:  An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 497–
503 (2012). 
 4. Because a monopolist produces less than would be produced under competitive 
conditions, unless demand is completely inelastic, some resources that would otherwise have 
been used to make the monopoly product will instead be used for other purposes—ones that 
consumers value demonstrably less.  This misallocation of resources results in diminished 
satisfaction of society’s wants and, thus, in terms of what society values, a reduction of 
society’s total wealth.  This effect is termed “allocative inefficiency” or the deadweight 
welfare loss.  Elimination of monopoly pricing would, ceteris paribis, increase society’s 
total wealth and, therefore, increase consumer satisfaction.  For a formal proof that 
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that raises prices by 300 percent would be fine because demand is 
probably inelastic within the relevant range.5  The more essential 
something is to a large percentage of consumers, the more likely it is a 
product for which everyone is welcome to fix prices.6 
 Finally, I’m going to permit every news related merger and joint 
venture.  It wouldn’t bother me if every hard copy and online source of 
news merged and there was only one source of news left in the United 
States.  The inefficiency effects of any resulting market power would be 
extremely difficult to demonstrate because news organizations compete 
with so much else for advertising and personnel.  Yet, these transactions 
would result in a tremendous cost savings due to the elimination of 
duplicative newsgathering operations, so they would be net efficient.7 
 I’m announcing these policy changes because they follow from the 
approach to antitrust I think best:  the efficiency-only approach.  The 
efficiency approach leads to these policies due to the relatively small size 
of the allocative inefficiency effects of monopoly power,8 the fact that 
inefficiency effects of market power are extraordinarily difficult to prove 
accurately or convincingly in a litigation setting,9 and the likely existence 
of efficiencies from most practices that are large enough to offset the 
resulting inefficiencies.10 
 
monopoly pricing causes allocative inefficiency, see EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS:  
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 208–31 (5th ed. 1982). 
 5. Hypothetical adapted from Steven C. Salop, Question:  What is the Real and Proper 
Antitrust Welfare Standard?  Answer:  The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 340 n.14 (2010). 
 6. Many pharmaceuticals would qualify, as would house keys, perhaps even gasoline in 
some circumstances; the list goes on and on. 
 7. If every news company merged in the long run, this could result in x-inefficiency.  I 
would of course give a higher priority to relatively certain cost savings and would discount 
future x-inefficiency effects because of their speculative nature and the time value of money. 
 8. The allocative inefficiency effects of market power are remarkably small.  The 
standard monopoly power diagram, see infra Part I.B.5, shows the allocative inefficiency 
effects of market power as being relatively large—one half as large as the transfer effects.  
This ratio, however, is only theoretical and is based upon some very unlikely assumptions. 
See infra Part I.B.5.  The best empirical results show that they normally are only between 20 
and 3 percent as large as the transfer effects.  The allocative inefficiency effects of market 
power are usually so small that they are not much more than a rounding error in the analysis. 
 9. Enforcers and other plaintiffs have only been able to demonstrate the size of the 
allocative inefficiency effects of market power in court on rare occasions.  I have found only 
one instance where this was done successfully. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. There often will be cost savings from firms getting together, even when they get 
together to fix prices.  Savings can include a large number of types of efficiencies, such as 
decreased advertising and other sales expenses, and consumers no longer will have to engage 
in inefficient comparison shopping (after all, prices will be identical). See ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 435 (1978).  Bork lists seven 
efficiencies that can arise from horizontal price fixing, including optimizing local sales 
efforts, providing the mechanism for the transfer of information, assisting the achievement of 
advertising economies of scale, and breaking down reseller cartels to prevent the misuse of 
local reseller monopolies. Id. 
  These savings often will tend to cause me not to challenge an otherwise suspect 
cartel—almost no matter how high prices rise.  Professor Williamson and others have 
showed that, for example, even a trivial, one fourth of 1 percent cost saving, usually will 
justify a merger likely to increase prices by ten percent. See supra note 2.  Even a 1 percent 
cost savings often can offset the allocative inefficiency from a 20 percent increase. Id.  This 
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  Except in those rare circumstances when we can prove the size of the 
allocative inefficiency we won’t challenge mergers or collusion.11  Even 
in these cases, moreover, unless prices rise so much that we can prove that 
the inefficiencies outweigh the cost savings, I won’t prosecute. 
  Why am I adopting the efficiency view of antitrust?  Because I think 
it’s the best approach.  Candidly, I didn’t even try to discern the intent of 
the Congress when it enacted the antitrust laws.  I didn’t examine the 
laws’ legislative history or perform a “textualist” or “plain reading” 
analysis to determine whether Congress wanted to protect consumer 
surplus from being taken by price fixers or bid riggers in the form of 
supracompetitive pricing, or whether Congress cared about consumer 
choice.  I think the goals of the antitrust laws are ambiguous, so I’m going 
to do what I think best.12 
It is extremely unlikely that anyone who heads the Antitrust Division or 
the FTC would ever be so candid and transparent.  But this sketch of some 
of the effects of an efficiency-only policy shows the importance of the 
inquiry that will follow.  This Article will attempt to determine the goals of 
the current U.S. antitrust statutes in two very different ways. 
 
means that even though consumers will pay much more and all of this increase—as well as 
the cost savings—will go to the monopolist, this does not matter.  So long as the merger is 
likely to be net efficient, and thus benefit society as a whole, I am going to allow it.  In 
addition, there surely will be some cases where the enforcers will be able to prove that 
innovation will diminish.  For a discussion of this prinicple, see Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. 
Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 
196–237 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121459. 
 11. I certainly believe that the allocative inefficiency effects of market power could be 
proven in court under the right circumstances.  But this is largely unknown territory.  I have 
conceded that the transfer effects of market power do not count, and it usually will be 
extremely difficult for us to prove the size of the relatively small inefficiencies loss from 
market power.  I am especially worried about challenging cartels where I am not sure of 
victory because if I fail enough times to show that allocative inefficiency exists and is so 
large it outweighs the cost savings, this could be the end of the per se rule against price 
fixing.  Suppose, for example, I can only show a successful efficiency balance five times out 
of the first ten cases where defendants resist my prosecution of their cartel.  The courts could 
erode or even repeal the per se rule because they would no longer believe price fixing or bid 
rigging is almost always anticompetitive.  It is not impossible that if I have a tremendous 
amount of trouble proving that either bid rigging or cartels are net inefficient, for 
administrative simplicity the courts eventually could switch to per se legality. 
 12. In light of my approach, I realize that I will be in no position to criticize my 
successor if he or she decides that the antitrust laws are all about fighting the political power 
of big business or something else I consider crazy.  They have as much right as I do to 
declare the statutes ambiguous and read almost whatever values they like into antitrust. 
  The courts might, of course, constrain me, or my successors.  That is, unless I can 
convince the courts that congressional intent is ambiguous or irrelevant.  If I win with this 
argument I will be able to impose my view of optimality for a while and, I concede, maybe 
my successors will as well.  I do concede, however, that sharp changes in antitrust policy 
would not be good for the country. 
  Even if the courts constrain me, I can still have significant effects on our economy 
until this happens.  Specifically, this will mean that lots of mergers to monopolies, joint 
ventures, bid rigging, and cartels will go forward.  Some will be challenged by state 
enforcers, but there are not enough of them to take up the slack.  Others will be challenged 
by private plaintiffs. 
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The first will be a traditional determination of congressional intent by 
examining the relevant legislative history:  the congressional debates and 
committee reports.  A traditional legislative history analysis of this issue 
was first performed by Judge Robert Bork in 1966, when he famously 
concluded that the legislative history showed that Congress’s sole reason 
for passing the Sherman Act was to enhance economic efficiency.13  I 
reanalyzed this same legislative history in 1982, except that these results 
concluded that Congress’s primary concern was with preventing wealth 
transfers (a polite term for theft) from consumers to firms with market 
power, and that economic efficiency was only a secondary concern.14 
Subsequent to this research a new approach to statutory interpretation has 
emerged, championed by Justice Scalia and known as the “textualist,” “fair 
reading,” or “plain meaning” approach.15  To my knowledge neither Justice 
Scalia nor anyone else has ever undertaken a textualist analysis of the 
antitrust statutes to determine whether the goal of these statutes is to 
enhance efficiency, to prevent firms with market power from using market 
power to steal from consumers, to enhance consumer choice, or to 
accomplish some other purpose.  This Article will undertake this task. 
The results of both analyses demonstrate that Congress’s primary 
concern was not with economic efficiency.  Rather, the primary goal of the 
antitrust statutes can, overall, best be described as a concern with the 
transfer effects of market power.16  Congress wanted consumers to be able 
to pay competitive prices—not supracompetitive prices—and condemned 
the use of market power to extract wealth (i.e., steal) from consumers.  An 
alternative way to describe this concern is that the property right we today 
call “consumers’ surplus” was defined and awarded to consumers.  
Supracompetitive prices were a concern not because of the allocative 
inefficiency they created, but because they constituted the theft of 
“consumers’ surplus” by cartels and other firms that violated the antitrust 
laws.17 
To be sure, some circumstances require special consideration:  situations 
where non-price or choice competition should be paramount,18 cases 
 
 13. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 
7, 26 (1966). 
 14. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust:  The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 69–70 (1982), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2065413. 
 15. For an explanation of this approach, see infra Part I.B. 
 16. The transfer concern is not the same thing as a concern with the distribution of 
wealth.  When a poor person steals from a rich person, this is an unfair transfer of wealth—
an improper taking of property—even though it results in a more even distribution of wealth.  
The wealth of the parties is irrelevant to the transfer or taking issue.  This would be true for 
both a pickpocket and a cartel. 
 17. For an illustration of the allocative inefficiency effects and wealth transfer effects of 
market power, see infra Part II.A. 
 18. In some relatively unusual circumstances a price approach will not work very well.  
In circumstances such as the earlier hypothetical merger of every newsgathering operation in 
the United States, the congressional concern with non-price issues best can be described in 
terms of “consumer choice” or non-price competition. See infra Part III. 
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involving monopsony power,19 and complexities involving overcharges to 
business consumers or overcharges that are passed through the distribution 
chain to indirect purchasers.20  Efficiency was indeed a concern of the 
law.21  Nevertheless, the overriding goal of the antitrust statutes was to 
protect consumers from theft.  This Article’s textualist analysis of section 2 
of the Sherman Act, moreover, shows that the law is supposed to prevent 
and condemn all privately created monopolies, with no exception for 
monopolies created by accident or efficient business conduct.22 
This Article concludes with a brief analysis of why an efficiency-only 
antitrust policy would be unduly weak:  the relatively small size of the 
allocative inefficiency effects of market power, the tremendous difficulties 
an efficiency-only policy would place on the enforcers to prove 
anticompetitive effects in court, and the almost intractable difficulties that 
are likely to arise when we try to balance allocative efficiency and cost 
savings in court. 
I.  WHAT CONGRESS ENACTED:  STEALING FROM CONSUMERS AS THE 
LYNCHPIN OF ANTITRUST 
There are many possible approaches to ascertaining what Congress 
intended when it enacted the antitrust laws.23  This assumes, of course, that 
one honestly wants to do this.  One might not want to determine Congress’s 
intention, preferring instead to give wide latitude in statutory interpretation 
to the enforcers and/or the courts.  Another implicit, although unstated, 
issue is the desire by government enforcers and courts to assume the power 
that comes from the ability to interpret statutes.  Although of course they 
would deny this intention, the more power they desire, the less likely they 
are to faithfully attempt to discern congressional goals.  Rather, they are 
 
 19. A “monopsony” is a market with a single buyer.  By contrast, a “monopoly” is a 
market with a single seller. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental 
Goal of Antitrust:  Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 191, 233–36 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1113927. 
 20. Professor Kirkwood observes that although Congress wanted to protect all 
consumers, regardless of where they were in the products’ distribution chain, their primary 
focus was on protecting the “consumers” in markets in which sellers with market power 
operate.  This should occur even if these consumers are businesses that sell these products to 
other consumers, and with recognition that consumers in downstream markets could be 
harmed.  This also could be termed a concern with protecting “purchasers.” See John B. 
Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust:  Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from 
Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425 (2013).  In light of multistage 
distribution, it often is difficult or even impossible to determine whether certain practices 
have harmed “real consumers” or “end users” or “ultimate consumers.” We could, instead, 
speak fairly in terms of “protecting purchasers” or “protecting buyers” who often will be 
dealing directly with the firms in question. 
 21. See infra notes 47–50. 
 22. See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
 23. See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditzlear, The Decline and Fall of 
Legislative History?  Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 
89 JUDICATURE 220 (2006); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History 
in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205 (2000). 
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more likely to find that congressional intent is ambiguous and impossible to 
ascertain, thus freeing them, within limits, to interpret the statutes as they 
choose.24 
 This is an especially important subject because the issue of how 
much deference the decision makers should give to Congress is not an all-
or-nothing decision.  The result will often depend upon which side has the 
burden of proof and how certain the decision makers thinks they should be.  
If the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to what Congress 
intended, there probably is no way to determine its ultimate goals.  But is a 
criminal law standard of proof appropriate? 
Everyone agrees we should faithfully interpret and implement the words 
of the statutes if they are clear.25  But what do we do when the words are 
ambiguous?  We could attempt to interpret ambiguity by using our best 
judgment as to what Congress would have done if it had considered the 
question.26  Although there are any number of approaches to dealing with 
the issue of congressional intent,27 this Article will discuss the two that 
appear to be the most common and prominent:  (1) a traditional or 
“purposivist”28 analysis of the debates in Congress and the relevant 
committee reports at the time the antitrust laws were enacted; (2) a 
“textualist” or “fair reading” approach that uses only the “plain meaning” of 
the words of the statutes as those words were commonly used when the 
antitrust laws were enacted. 
 
 24. Of course, this approach implicitly frees the enforcers’ and judges’ successors to do 
the same, and thus to reverse their decisions.  Stare decisis might, of course, constrain them 
to some extent.  Moreover, some enforcers could assume their viewpoint will prevail forever 
and thus be eager to take the risk that their successors will never be in a position to 
implement, for example, a “big business is bad/small business is good” approach to antitrust, 
at least not in their lifetime. 
 25. United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) (“[W]here the language of 
an enactment is clear, and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or 
impractical consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the 
meaning intended.”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 16 (1997) (“[W]hen the text of a statute is clear, that is the end of the 
matter.”). 
 26. As Judge Bork noted, the task of ascertaining the will of Congress should be “an 
attempt to construct the thing we call ‘legislative intent’ using conventional methods of 
collecting and reconciling the evidence provided by the Congressional Record.” Bork, supra 
note 13, at 7 n.2. 
 27. See Tiefer, supra note 23, at 207–10. 
 28. A traditional analysis of the legislative history of a statute, one that relied upon the 
congressional debates and committee reports, is sometimes called a “purposivist” analysis. 
See generally Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 18 (2012) (“So-called purposivism, which has been called 
‘the basic judicial approach these days.’”). 
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A.  The Traditional Legislative History Approach:  Using Congressional 
Debates and Committee Reports29 
The legislative history of the Sherman Act30 contains many statements of 
concern by Senator Sherman31 and other legislators32 that the trusts and 
other businesses of the period had or would likely acquire enough power to 
raise prices.  Judge Bork summarized this portion of the debates eloquently:  
“The touchstone of illegality is raising prices to consumers.  There were no 
exceptions.”33  There is little disagreement that supracompetitive pricing 
was the preoccupation of the debates.34 
The key question, however, is precisely why Congress objected when 
trusts, cartels, and monopolies raised prices to consumers.  
Supracompetitive prices cause two direct economic effects:  the transfer of 
surplus from consumers to cartels (i.e., the stealing effect), and allocative 
inefficiency.  Which one was Congress’s concern? Were both? 
The Sherman Act’s legislative debates make this clear.35  For example, 
Senator Sherman termed the higher prices “extortion,”36 and “extorted 
wealth.”37  One Congressman referred to the overcharges as “robbery,”38 
and another complained that the trusts, “without rendering the slightest 
equivalent,” have “stolen untold millions from the people.”39 Another 
Congressman complained that the beef trust “robs the farmer on the one 
hand and the consumer on the other.”40  Another declared that the trusts 
were “impoverishing” the people through “robbery.”41  Another declared 
that monopolistic pricing was “a transaction the only purpose of which is to 
 
 29. This section is based upon material contained in Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 19, 
and Lande, supra note 14.  The author wrote these pieces because he believes in the 
soundness of the traditional approach to ascertaining congressional intent. 
 30. For similar statements from the legislative history of the Clayton Act, see Lande, 
supra note 14, at 128.  For similar statements from the legislative history of the Celler-
Kefauver Act, see id. at 135–36.  For similar statements from the legislative history of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, see id. at 112–14. 
 31. See 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (noting that trusts tend 
to “advance the cost to the consumer”); Id. at 2460 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (observing 
that it is sometimes contended that trusts reduced prices to the consumer, “but all experience 
shows that this saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer”); Id. at 2462 (statement of 
Sen. Sherman) (asking Congress to protect the public from trusts that “restrain commerce, 
turn it from its natural courses, increase the price of articles, and therefore diminish the 
amount of commerce”). 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 2558 (statement of Sen. Pugh) (noting that trusts effectively 
“destroy[] competition in production and thereby increas[e] prices to consumers”). 
 33. Bork, supra note 13, at 16. 
 34. See id.; Lande, supra note 14, passim. 
 35. See Bork, supra note 13 (believing that allocative history was the primary concern of 
the legislature). 
 36. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (quoting Sen. Sherman). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 2614 (statement of Rep. Coke). 
 39. Id. at 4101 (statement of Rep. Heard). 
 40. Id. at 4098 (statement of Rep. Taylor). 
 41. Id. at 4103 (statement of Rep. Fithian) (reading, with apparent approval, a letter from 
a constituent). 
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extort from the community . . . wealth which ought . . . to be generally 
diffused over the whole community.”42 Finally, one complained:  “They 
aggregate to themselves great, enormous wealth by extortion.”43 
Do terms like “stealing,” “robbery,” “extortion,” and “stolen wealth” 
sound like synonyms for allocative inefficiency?  Or is it more likely that 
Congress in effect awarded the property right to what we today call 
“consumers’ surplus” to consumers?  Under this view, the taking of 
consumers’ surplus by cartels and other business arrangements that violate 
the antitrust laws constitutes in effect the theft of consumer’s property. 
Congress wanted to protect consumers who purchased products and 
services; it made no distinction between wealthy and poor consumers, direct 
and indirect consumers, or business consumers and individual end-user 
consumers.44  Nor did Congress seem concerned about the issue of who 
ultimately bore the cost of monopoly overcharges (i.e., Congress did not 
seem concerned whether direct purchasers absorbed all the overcharges or 
passed all or part of them on to the next level in the chain of distribution).45  
Rather, Congress could see that prices to those who purchased from a 
 
 42. Id. at 2728 (statement of Sen. Hoar). 
 43. Id. at 1768 (statement of Sen. George). 
 44. As Prof. Kirkwood shows, the best way to phrase this concern is a primary concern 
with the direct consumers or purchasers in the markets at issue. See generally Kirkwood, 
supra note 20. Thus, the best and most straightforward way to embrace Congress’s concern 
for “consumers” would be to equate it to a primary concern with the direct purchasers of 
goods and services sold by cartels, monopolies, etc.  In other words, any direct purchaser 
should be deemed a “consumer” for antitrust purposes, regardless of what they decided to do 
with the good or service they purchased. 
  It would be a complicated, time-consuming, and useless task to attempt to determine 
precisely what happened to each good and service sold by a cartel.  Depending upon the 
product, some would be consumed by direct purchasers, some would be resold, and others 
would be incorporated into different products.  Otherwise, every price rise caused by a 
monopoly, cartel, etc., would have to be examined through an oftentimes long chain of 
production and distribution to determine whether it had been absorbed by intermediaries or 
whether, and to what degree, it had been passed on to consumers.  This can be a very 
difficult undertaking.  Firms that otherwise would have violated the antitrust laws should not 
be excused on the grounds that they “only” harmed business purchasers.  Many of the 
complexities that would arise if the standard were limited to the welfare of ultimate 
consumers are analyzed in Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman Act:  Consumer 
Welfare in a New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707 (2007).  These problems can all be avoided, 
however, by focusing only upon the direct purchasers. 
 45. See generally Lande, supra note 14.  While Congress frequently referred to 
“consumers,” it did not appear to care only about ultimate consumers.  Rather, 
Congress wanted to protect all who were overcharged. Id.  Moreover, a number of decisions 
explicitly refer to protecting buyers, purchasers, or customers (not just consumers).  For 
example, the Supreme Court noted in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. 
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983):  “As the legislative 
history shows, the Sherman Act was enacted to assure customers the benefits of price 
competition.” Id.; see also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 
489 (1968) (“The reason is that he has paid more than he should and his property has been 
illegally diminished, for had the price paid been lower his profits would have been higher 
. . . .  As long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer more 
than the law allows.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“[T]he very purpose of antitrust law is to ensure that the benefits of competition flow to 
purchasers of goods affected by the violation.” (citing to the district court opinion)). 
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monopoly or cartel increased and enacted the antitrust laws to prevent this 
from happening.46 
Of course, the Congresses that enacted the Sherman Act,47 FTC Act,48 
Clayton Act,49 and Celler-Kefauver Act50 certainly did appreciate corporate 
productive efficiency.  But they nevertheless passed the antitrust laws that 
in so many ways attacked these highly efficient corporations.  If all they 
wanted was to encourage the form of industrial organization that was most 
efficient, Congress would have praised the trusts, not condemned them in 
the legislative debates. 
 
 46. A possible exception for a monopoly that acquired its position through superior 
efficiency will be discussed infra Part I.B.4. 
 47. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (“[The bill] does not in the least 
affect combinations in aid of production where there is free and fair competition.”); Id. at 
2460 (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (“It is sometimes said of these combinations [the 
monopolistic trusts] that they reduce prices to the consumer by better methods of production, 
but all experience shows that this saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer . . . .  
Experience has shown that they are the most useful agencies of modern civilization. They 
have enabled individuals to unite to undertake great enterprises only attempted in former 
times by powerful governments. The good results of corporate power are shown in the vast 
development of our railroads and the enormous increase of business and production of all 
kinds.”). 
 48. See 51 CONG. REC. 12,146 (1914) (statement of Sen. Hollis) (“Fair competition is 
competition which is successful through superior efficiency. Competition is unfair when it 
resorts to methods which shut out competitors who, by reason of their efficiency, might 
otherwise be able to continue in business and prosper. Without the use of unfair methods no 
corporation can grow beyond the limits imposed upon it by the necessity of being as efficient 
as any competitor. The mere size of a corporation which maintains its position solely 
through superior efficiency is ordinarily no menace to the public interest.”); see also id. at 
11,231 (statement of Sen. Robinson) (“Nearly all normal business men can distinguish 
between ‘fair competition’ and ‘unfair competition.’ Efficiency is generally regarded as the 
fundamental principle of the former—efficiency in producing and in selling; while 
oppression or advantage obtained by deception or some questionable means is the 
distinguishing characteristic of ‘unfair competition.’” (quoting William H.S. Stevens, a 
leading economist of the times)); id. at 8854 (statement of Rep. Morgan) (“To enable us to 
secure all the benefits and advantages of the large industrial unit and escape the evils and 
dangers thereof . . . .  To relieve doubt and uncertainty in business, develop trade, encourage 
commerce, and promote enterprise.”).  Additional concern for efficiency can be found in the 
earliest proceedings of the FTC, which noted its desire in making rulings and orders “to 
promote business efficiency and, within the limits of practicability, to cooperate with the 
business world in developing the best standards of commercial ethics.” FTC, ANNUAL 
REPORT 26 (1916). 
 49. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 14,223 (remarks of Sen. Thompson) (noting his desire to 
protect consumers and to encourage corporate efficiency:  “The chief purpose of antitrust 
legislation is for the protection of the public, to protect it from extortion practiced by the 
trust, but at the same time not to take away from it any advantages of cheapness or better 
service which honest, intelligent cooperation may bring”).  For other discussions of the 
legislative history, see Muris, supra note 2. 
 50. See Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
81st Cong. 61 (1949) (statement of Rep. Celler) (stating that a “main reason for antitrust 
laws is that we believe the competitive system is more efficient than monopoly”); see also 
Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 
140, 308 (1950) (statement of Sen. Donelly) (expressing concern with the bill’s “effect on 
prices, the effect on productive efficiency”). 
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On the contrary, the congressional debates51 and committee reports52 
show that the antitrust laws primarily were enacted to prevent higher 
prices53 and wealth transfers from consumers to firms with market power.54  
If Congress primarily had cared about enhancing economic efficiency, it 
would have enacted “protrust” laws, not “antitrust” laws. 
B.  A “Textualist,” “Plain Meaning,” or “Fair Reading” Analysis of the 
Antitrust Laws:  What Would Justice Scalia Do? 
Justice Scalia has long been the chief advocate of a method of 
interpreting legislation known as the “textualist,” “fair reading,” or “plain 
 
 51. For citations demonstrating this wealth transfer concern in the legislative debates 
over the Clayton Act, FTC Act, and Celler-Kefauver Act, see Lande, supra note 14, passim.  
To give just one vivid example, during the FTC Act debates Senator Lane identified the 
results of the problems as “the fraud and the theft which is being practiced upon the people 
of this country . . . which mulct the people of this country out of hundreds of millions of 
dollars each year . . . .  [The people] are also being compelled to pay arbitrarily fixed and 
unjustly high prices for what they consume, they are being robbed.” 51 CONG. REC. 13,223 
(statement of Sen. Lane). 
 52. As an example of this concern, the Minority Report of the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce complained in their discussions of the bill that would 
become the FTC Act, that “[t]he common people are staggering under the burden they bear 
as a result of contributing extortionate profits to the trusts and monopolies.” H.R. REP. NO. 
63-533, pt. 3, at 5 (1914) (minority report) (Rep. Lafferty’s views).  Senator Newlands, the 
FTC Act’s main sponsor and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate 
Commerce, framed the issue as a concern for “unreasonable and extortionate prices.” See 
S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 25 (1914).  Newlands also spoke in terms of an “unfair or 
unreasonable price.” Id. 
 53. For examples of this concern in committee reports in the FTC Act deliberations, the 
goals of “protecting consumers against too high prices and [guarding] the interests of 
employees” were expressed by the House in H.R. REP. NO. 63-533, pt. I, at 4 (quoting from 
the Preliminary Report of the Industrial Commission, submitted to Congress in 1900).  The 
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce wanted to keep “within limited bounds the 
activities of a multitude of price-fixing associations in different branches of business, which, 
together with the great trusts, have been potent causes of the present high cost of living.” 
S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 9.  
 54. Since the legislative history is so clear, one might ask how the efficiency orientation 
could have gained so much ground. There are three possible, nonexclusive explanations: 
  1. The election of President Reagan in 1980 put enforcers and judges in power who 
were predisposed to accept the efficiency explanation. 
  2. The only available alternative to the efficiency model during the transition to the 
Reagan Administration was the big is bad/small is good, social/political model, which was 
correctly perceived by decisionmakers as almost standardless and overly difficult to 
administer in a predictable manner. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 13, at 9.  By contrast, the 
wealth transfer approach is just as easy to administer, and just as predictable, as the 
efficiency model. See infra Part II.C.  This wealth transfer is model was not, however, 
available at the dawn of the Reagan Administration, so it perhaps was natural that the 
decision makers instead opted for the model that economists were using—economic 
efficiency. 
  3. Confusion over the term “consumer welfare.”  Bork’s extremely influential work 
advocated maximizing “consumer welfare,” a seemingly pro-consumer objective.  However, 
he defined the term so that it included a concern with the welfare of monopolies and cartels; 
prices could rise and “consumer welfare” could still increase!  His deceptive use of the term 
“consumer welfare,” instead of the more honest term “total welfare,” was a brilliant way to 
market the efficiency objective. 
 2013] A TRADITIONAL AND TEXTUALIST ANALYSIS 2361 
meaning” approach.55  He has often been joined in this approach by other 
Supreme Court Justices.56 
Justice Scalia expressly rejects the use of such traditional legislative 
history as the debates in Congress and the reports of congressional 
committees.57  He explains:  “In any major piece of legislation, the 
legislative history is extensive, and there is something for everybody.  As 
Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick is to look over the heads of 
the crowd and pick out your friends.  The variety and specificity of result 
that legislative history can achieve is unparalleled.”58  He explained further: 
 
 55. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 428, 436, 441; see also SCALIA, supra note 
25.  Justice Scalia makes an important distinction:  “Textualism should not be confused with 
so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole 
philosophy into disrepute.  I am not a strict constructionist, and no one ought to be—though 
better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist.  A text should not be construed strictly, and it 
should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it 
fairly means.” SCALIA, supra note 25, at 23. 
 56. For examples, see Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 23, at 220–21, and Tiefer, supra 
note 23, at 216–17. 
 57. Scalia said, “To say that I used legislative history is simply, to put it bluntly, a lie.” 
Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Weighs In on Posner’s Controversial Book Review, Calls 
Posner’s Assertion “a Lie,” ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/scalia_weighs_in_on_a_controversial_book_review [hereinafter “Interview”].  
Justice Scalia was responding to an article by Judge Posner. Id.  Judge Posner responded as 
follows:  “[Scalia] may not consider such a historical inquiry to be an exercise of ‘legislative 
history,’ because he defines legislative history very narrowly.” Text of Judge Posner’s 
Respose [sic] to Justice Scalia, THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2012), http://newsand
insight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/09_-_September/Text_of_Judge_Posner_s_
respose_to_Justice_Scalia/.  Posner also said:   
His coauthor, Bryan Garner, does not define it so.  Here is the definition of the 
term in Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), of which Garner is the editor:  
“The background and events leading to the enactment of a statute, including 
hearings, committee reports, and floor debates.”  The “background and events 
leading to the enactment” of the Second Amendment are the focus of the Heller 
opinion. 
Id.  Posner also said: 
[I]n seeking the original eighteenth-century meaning of the text of the Second 
Amendment Justice Scalia had been doing legislative history.  His quest for 
original meaning had taken him to a variety of English and American sources from 
which he distilled the existence of a common law right of armed self-defense that 
he argued had been codified in the Second Amendment. 
Id.   
 58. SCALIA, supra note 25, at 36.  Scalia writes:   
[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair 
government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, 
rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.  That seems to me one step worse 
than the trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in:  posting edicts high up on 
the pillars, so that they could not easily be read.  Government by unexpressed 
intent is similarly tyrannical.  It is the law that governs, not the intent of the 
lawgiver.  
Id. at 17.  Further, he quotes Holmes:   
“Only a day or two ago—when counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I 
was indiscreet enough to say I don’t care what their intention was.  I only want to 
know what the words mean.”  And I agree with Holmes’s other remark, quoted 
approvingly by Justice Jackson:  “We do not inquire what the legislature meant; 
we ask only what the statute means.” 
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Why would you think this [material—the legislative debates and 
committee reports—] is an expression of the legislature’s intent?  And the 
more you use that garbage, the less accurate it is.  What—one of . . . the 
major—functions of . . . hot shot Washington lawyers is drafting 
legislative history.  You send it up to the hill, and get a friendly Senator to 
read it into the record or something else, to change the meaning of the text 
that’s adopted.  So, you know, . . . it’s crazy.59 
Instead Justice Scalia attempts to ascertain the “plain meaning” of the 
text of statutes by making extensive use of material such as roughly 
contemporaneous dictionaries and legal decisions to define key terms.60 
Justice Scalia also examines the country’s history at approximately the time 
of the legislation and the legislation’s societal context to help define the 
particular words or phrases in the statutes.  He does this even though it is 
contrary to the traditional approach for determining congressional intent:  
 [A]ny legal audience knows what legislative history is.  It’s the history of 
the enactment of the bill.  It’s the floor speeches.  It’s the prior drafts of 
committees.  That’s what legislative history is.  It isn’t the history of the 
times.  It’s not what people thought it meant immediately after its 
enactment.61  
1.  Justice Scalia Has Not Performed a Textualist Analysis of 
the Relevant Antitrust Terms 
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia has not performed a textualist analysis of 
any of the antitrust laws that address the overall goal or goals of the statutes 
or the efficiency/wealth transfer debate.  Justice Scalia has authored three 
opinions,62 three concurrences,63 and three dissenting64 opinions in antitrust 
 
Id. at 22–23 (footnotes omitted). 
 59. Newsmaker:  Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Bryan A. Garner, THOMSON 
REUTERS (September 17, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/uploadedFiles/
Reuters_Content/2012/09_-_September/Scalia_Reuters_transcript.pdf [hereinafter “Scalia 
Interview”].  Justice Scalia has also written: 
It is much more likely to produce a false or contrived legislative intent than a 
genuine one.  The first and most obvious reason for this is that, with respect to 
99.99 percent of the issues of construction reaching the courts, there is no 
legislative intent, so that any clues provided by the legislative history are bound to 
be false.  Those issues almost invariably involve points of relative detail, compared 
with the major sweep of the statute in question.  
SCALIA, supra note 25, at 32. 
 60. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 33, 37.  Immediately after Scalia introduces 
the “fair reading” method, on page 33, he cites three sources on guides to statutory 
interpretation, and then, as examples of permissible and useful sources of meaning, four 
contemporary dictionary definitions of key terms. Id. at 33–39. 
 61. Scalia Interview, supra note 59. 
 62. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,  540 U.S. 398 
(2004); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Bus. Elecs. 
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).   
 63. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 176 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640–41 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 576–81 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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cases.  Most do not even come close to undertaking a textualist analysis of 
the goals of the antitrust laws.65  Nevertheless, some of these opinions are 
instructive illustrations of textualist analysis. 
For example, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,66 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority in part and dissenting in part, performed a 
textualist analysis of the term “boycott,” as it was used in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exception to the antitrust laws: 
Determining proper application of § 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
to the present cases requires precise definition of the word “boycott.”  It is 
a relatively new word, little more than a century old.  It was first used in 
1880, to describe the collective action taken against Captain Charles 
Boycott, an English agent managing various estates in Ireland . . . .  Thus, 
the verb made from the unfortunate Captain’s name has had from the 
outset the meaning it continues to carry today.  To “boycott” means “[t]o 
combine in refusing to hold relations of any kind, social or commercial, 
public or private, with (a neighbour), on account of political or other 
differences, so as to punish him for the position he has taken up, or coerce 
him into abandoning it.”67 
Justice Scalia then used the above dictionary definition to resolve a key 
legal dispute: 
Petitioners have suggested that a boycott ordinarily requires “an absolute 
refusal to deal on any terms,” which was concededly not the case here 
. . . .  We think not.  As the definition just recited provides, the refusal 
may be imposed “to punish [the target] for the position he has taken up, or 
coerce him into abandoning it.”  The refusal to deal may, in other words, 
be conditional, offering its target the incentive of renewed dealing if and 
when he mends his ways.  This is often the case—and indeed seems to 
have been the case with the original Boycott boycott.  Furthermore, other 
 
In F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Justice Scalia declined to join the majority in part because of its 
extensive use of legislative history:   
I concur in the judgment of the Court because the language of the statute is readily 
susceptible of the interpretation the Court provides and because only that 
interpretation is consistent with the principle that statutes should be read in accord 
with the customary deference to the application of foreign countries’ laws within 
their own territories.  
F. Hoffmann-La Roche¸ 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 64. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 800–22 (1993) (Justice Scalia 
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part I and delivered a dissenting opinion 
with respect to Part II); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
486–504 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 333–
43 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65. See Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 370–84; see also F. Hoffmann-La 
Roche, 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring); Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 640–41 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 486–504 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 66. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 800–22 (Scalia, J., writing for the majority in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 67. Id. at 800–01 (footnote omitted) (quoting 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468 (2d 
ed. 1989)). 
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dictionary definitions extend the term to include a partial boycott—a 
refusal to engage in some, but not all, transactions with the target.68 
This is significant because it illustrates Justice Scalia’s use of roughly 
contemporaneous dictionary definitions (he used a 1950 dictionary to define 
a term in a 1946 law), a technique that will be discussed below. 
The Scalia opinion that would have been most likely to undertake the 
relevant textualist analysis was Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko because the case involved the core meaning of 
section 2 of the Sherman Act.69  Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s opinion did 
not undertake a textualist analysis of the overall meaning of section 2.  He 
instead simply cited precedent70 for his assertion that the Sherman Act 
contains an exception for a monopolist that gains its monopoly through 
historical accident or superior efficiency.71 
Justice Scalia extensively analyzed the term “restraint of trade” in 
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. using a common 
law–based textualist analysis, but he was not looking for the ultimate goals 
of the Sherman Act.72  Rather, he distinguished the idea of a “restraint of 
trade” from the understanding of which specific business practices 
restrained trade.73  His opinion considered the common law antecedents of 
modern antitrust law, but did not involve the efficiency/transfer issue.74 
 
 68. Id. (citations omitted) (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 321 (2d 
ed. 1950) (defining “boycott” as “to withhold, wholly or in part, social or business 
intercourse from, as an expression of disapproval or means of coercion” (emphasis added)). 
 69. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004).   
 70. Justice Scalia does believe in the use of precedent and stare decisis. See generally 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
 71. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 540 U.S. at 407.  Justice Scalia stated:   
The complaint alleges that Verizon denied interconnection services to rivals in 
order to limit entry.  If that allegation states an antitrust claim at all, it does so 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, which declares that a firm shall not “monopolize” or 
“attempt to monopolize.”  It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to 
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, “the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.  
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 
(1966)).  
 72. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988).   
 73. Id.  Scalia wrote:   
In resting our decision upon the foregoing economic analysis, we do not ignore 
common-law precedent concerning what constituted “restraint of trade” at the  
time the Sherman Act was adopted.  But neither do we give that pre-1890 
precedent the dispositive effect some would.  The term “restraint of trade” in the 
statute, like the term at common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements, 
but to a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite 
different sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances . . . .  The 
Sherman Act adopted the term “restraint of trade” along with its dynamic 
potential.  It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that 
the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.  If it were otherwise, not only 
would the line of per se illegality have to be drawn today precisely where it was in 
1890, but also case-by-case evaluation of legality (conducted where per se rules do 
not apply) would have to be governed by 19th-century notions of reasonableness. 
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Finally, although Justice Scalia did not discuss the issue of the ultimate 
goals of the antitrust laws, it is instructive that in a concurring opinion in 
Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, a Robinson-Patman Act case, he wrote: 
The language of the Act is straightforward:  Any price discrimination 
whose effect “may be substantially . . . to injure, destroy, or prevent 
competition” is prohibited, unless it is immunized by the “cost 
justification” defense, i.e., unless it “make[s] only due allowance for 
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the 
differing methods or quantities in which [the] commodities are . . . sold or 
delivered.”  There is no exception for “reasonable” functional discounts 
that do not meet this requirement.”75 
This textualist discussion is noteworthy because it affirms the common 
sense idea that no exception should be implied in the law unless it is 
explicitly a part of the statute.76 
Since Justice Scalia has not performed a plain meaning examination of 
the Antitrust laws to decide their goals, this Article will undertake the task 
using his methodology.77  This Article will perform a textualist analysis of 
the antitrust statutes to help clarify which goal or goals Congress wanted to 
be embodied in these laws. 
As discussed, if Justice Scalia’s textualist analysis were applied to 
antitrust statutes, neither the Congressional debates nor the committee 
reports would be analyzed.78  A textualist analysis would, however, 
 
It would make no sense to create out of the single term “restraint of trade” a 
chronologically schizoid statute, in which a “rule of reason” evolves with new 
circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of per se illegality remains forever fixed 
where it was.  
Id. at 731–32 (citations omitted). 
  Justice Scalia also cited, with apparent approval, a pre–Sherman Act common law 
case. Id. at 731 (citing Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) (noting that 
the English case laying down the common-law rule that contracts in restraint of trade are 
invalid “was made under a condition of things, and a state of society, different from those 
which now prevail, [and therefore] the rule laid down is not regarded as inflexible, and has 
been considerably modified”).  
 74. He wrote:   
Of course the common law, both in general and as embodied in the Sherman Act, 
does not lightly assume that the economic realities underlying earlier decisions 
have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those realities were in error.  It 
is relevant, therefore, whether the common law of restraint of trade ever prohibited 
as illegal per se an agreement of the sort made here, and whether our decisions 
under § 1 of the Sherman Act have ever expressed or necessarily implied such a 
prohibition. 
Id. at 732–33. 
 75. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 579 (1990) (alterations in original) (citation 
omitted). 
 76. This will be important in Part I.B.4 during the discussion of whether section 2 of the 
Sherman Act actually contains an “exception” for monopolies attained by superior 
efficiency. 
 77. This article does not agree with Justice Scalia that traditional legislative history 
should be ignored and a textualist analysis should instead be performed. 
 78. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 369 (“The false notion that committee 
reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in statutory construction.”). 
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undertake a number of inquiries to ascertain what the statutes “plainly” 
mean.  To do this the inquiry would examine: 
(1) The definitions of the key terms in dictionaries (Justice Scalia seems 
especially interested in the definitions of key words in contemporary 
dictionaries79), legal dictionaries, and legal treatises that existed when 
these laws were passed.  Ideally we would find and analyze sources 
defining these terms when the antitrust laws were passed.80 
(2) Pre-1890 English common law cases should be examined to determine 
whether the federal antitrust statutes borrowed key terms from the 
common law and, if so, what they meant in common law decisions.81  It 
could even be possible to make inferences from state antitrust statutes—
and their subsequent interpretations by courts—that existed when the 
federal antitrust laws were passed, in case the federal laws borrowed key 
terms from a state statute.82 
(3) Another inquiry would be into how federal antitrust cases from the 
1890s used these terms to help determine “what people thought it meant 
immediately after its enactment.”83  Did the definitions of these terms in 
 
 79. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  Immediately after Scalia & Garner 
introduce the “fair reading” method, on page 33, they cite three sources on guides to 
statutory interpretation, and then, as examples of permissible and useful sources of meaning, 
four dictionary definitions of key terms. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 37. 
 80. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 78 (“Words must be given the meaning they 
had when the text was adopted.”); see also id. at 415–24. 
 81. Id. at 320 (“Cannon of Imputed Common-Law Meaning:  A statute that uses a 
common-law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning.”); see also id. 
(where Justice Scalia cited, with apparent approval, a pre–Sherman Act common law 
antitrust case). 
 82. This surely is the weakest of the aids to interpretation because state statutes could be 
inconsistent with one another.  In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Scalia 
examined state constitutional provisions and statutes to help determine what various terms in 
the Second Amendment meant:   
  From our review of founding-era sources, we conclude that this natural 
meaning was also the meaning that “bear arms” had in the 18th century. In 
numerous instances, “bear arms” was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying 
of weapons outside of an organized militia. The most prominent examples are 
those most relevant to the Second Amendment: Nine state constitutional provisions 
written in the 18th century or the first two decades of the 19th, which enshrined a 
right of citizens to “bear arms in defense of themselves and the state” or “bear 
arms in defense of himself and the state . . . .  That was also the interpretation of 
those state constitutional provisions adopted by pre–Civil War state courts. 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 584–85 (citations omitted).  Scalia also was guided by analogous state 
statutes:  
Many colonial statutes required individual arms-bearing for public-safety 
reasons—such as the 1770 Georgia law that “for the security and defence of this 
province from internal dangers and insurrections” required those men who 
qualified for militia duty individually “to carry fire arms” “to places of public 
worship.”  That broad public-safety understanding was the connotation given to 
the North Carolina right by that State’s Supreme Court in 1843. 
Id. at 601 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting 19 COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE 
STATE OF GEORGIA 137–39 (A. Candler ed. 1911 (pt. 2)).  
 83. See supra text accompanying note 60.  Justice Scalia noted the first interpretation of 
certain constitutional amendments in the first case to consider them, in a context that 
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the period just after the laws’ enactments indicate, for example, whether 
the transfer effects of market power were meant to count in antitrust 
analysis?  This is perhaps another way of giving effect to the doctrine of 
stare decisis:  if a statute was interpreted one way shortly after it was 
enacted, that interpretation should be given respect.84 
(4)  A textualist analysis also would consider the “history of the times.”85  
It would attempt to use the history of the period producing the antitrust 
 
suggests this was more likely to be their correct interpretation. SCALIA & GARNER, supra 
note 28, at 101–02. 
 84. In Heller, Justice Scalia used statutory interpretations of the Second Amendment that 
were from the period shortly after it was adopted as a guide to determine its meaning.  As he 
explained: 
We now address how the Second Amendment was interpreted from immediately 
after its ratification through the end of the 19th century. Before proceeding, 
however, we take issue with Justice Stevens’ equating of these sources with 
postenactment legislative history, a comparison that betrays a fundamental 
misunderstanding of a court’s interpretive task.  “Legislative history,” of course, 
refers to the pre-enactment statements of those who drafted or voted for a law; it is 
considered persuasive by some, not because they reflect the general understanding 
of the disputed terms, but because the legislators who heard or read those 
statements presumably voted with that understanding.  “Postenactment legislative 
history,” a deprecatory contradiction in terms, refers to statements of those who 
drafted or voted for the law that are made after its enactment and hence could have 
had no effect on the congressional vote.  It most certainly does not refer to the 
examination of a variety of legal and other sources to determine the public 
understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratification.  That 
sort of inquiry is a critical tool of constitutional interpretation.  As we will show, 
virtually all interpreters of the Second Amendment in the century after its 
enactment interpreted the amendment as we do . . . .  The 19th-century cases that 
interpreted the Second Amendment universally support an individual right 
unconnected to militia service.    
Heller, 554 U.S. at 605, 610 (citations omitted).  Scalia also analyzed the meaning of “keep 
arms” and was guided by interpretations in cases decided shortly after the enactment of the 
Second Amendment. Id. at 583 n.7.  In other parts of his opinion Justice Scalia also looked 
for guidance as to the meanings of critical terms by analyzing postenactment cases from the 
era:  
This is fully consistent with the ordinary definition of the militia as all able-bodied 
men . . . .  That is what Congress did in the first militia Act, which specified that 
“each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, 
resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age 
of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and 
respectively be enrolled in the militia. 
Id. at 596 (quoting Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271) (citation omitted).  Further: 
Writing for the court in an 1825 libel case, Chief Justice Parker wrote:  “The 
liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be 
responsible in cases of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not 
protect him who uses them for annoyance or destruction.”  The analogy makes no 
sense if firearms could not be used for any individual purpose at all . . . .  Between 
1789 and 1820, nine States adopted Second Amendment analogues. 
Id. at 602 (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313–14 (1825)) (citations 
omitted). 
 85. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 399 (“The false notion that lawyers and 
judges, not being historians, are unqualified to do the historical research that originalism 
requires.”).  Scalia and Garner then discuss how the history of gun use in the United States 
helps interpret a gun control statute. Id. at 400–02; see also supra note 60.  Moreover, Scalia 
quotes, with apparent approval, Chief Justice Taney: 
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laws to help ascertain what Congress meant when it used terms like 
“monopolize” or “restraint of trade” in the Sherman Act. 
(5)  Finally, a textualist analysis would not imply any exception that is not 
plainly evident in the words of the statutes.86  If an antitrust law contains 
an explicit exception, then of course that exception would be respected.  
But no nonexplicit exceptions would be inferred in order to achieve some 
overall goal or purpose of the statute.87 
2.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act:  Concerns with Price and Choice 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract, combination or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade.”88  Can the operative term, “in restraint of 
trade,” best be characterized in terms of efficiency, of the transfer effects of 
market power, or in some other manner? 
Could “restraint of trade” be a synonym for conduct that was 
productively inefficient?  Were the trusts, monopolies, and cartels of the 
period condemned because they were so inept at making their products that 
their inefficient production “restrained trade”?  Was Congress so concerned 
with corporate activity that was productively inefficient that it passed the 
Sherman Act primarily to help save corporate costs?  For example, did 
Congress condemn Rockefeller because Standard Oil was so inefficient at 
producing oil?89 
I am not aware that the trusts existing during the period when the 
Sherman Act was passed were ever accused of being inefficient.  Although 
 
“In expounding this law, the judgment of the court cannot, in any degree, be 
influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress 
in the debate which took place on its passage, nor by the motives or reasons 
assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered.  The 
law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in 
which that will is spoken is in the act itself:  and we must gather their intention 
from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the 
laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the 
times in which it was passed.” 
SCALIA, supra note 25, at 30 (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845) 
(emphasis added)). 
 86. See supra text accompanying note 78.  “Yeah. I mean, that—the law is a law. It’s not 
up to the judges to make exceptions to the law because—it seems to me that—compassion—
that’s—that’s not the judge’s job.” Scalia Interview, supra note 58, at 23.  
 87. Scalia believes no exception should be inferred to achieve a greater purpose because:   
[E]ven if you think our laws mean not what the legislature enacted but what the 
legislators intended, there is no way to tell what they intended except the text. 
Nothing but the text has received the approval of the majority of the legislature and 
of the President, assuming that he signed it rather than vetoed it and had it passed 
over his veto.  Nothing but the text reflects the full legislature’s purpose.  Nothing.  
Antonin Scalia, & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1612 (2012). 
 88. “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared 
to be illegal.  Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 89. Were many people in 1890 in effect saying, “We condemn Rockefeller because he is 
so inefficient at producing petroleum products!  His inefficiency is harming our country!”? 
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many unkind things were said about Rockefeller and Standard Oil, I am not 
aware he was ever even accused of inefficiently running his oil company.90  
Nor did the Department of Justice, when prosecuting the Standard Oil trust, 
ever assert that the company was inefficient or that it should be found to 
have violated the Sherman Act because it was inefficient.91 
Indeed, the trusts were among the most efficient businesses of their 
times.92  They were in large part responsible for price levels that fell, not 
rose, both in general and for many specific products that were the subject of 
trusts during the period just before the Sherman Act’s passage.93  If 
efficiency had been Congress’s overriding concern, it would have enacted a 
“protrust law” not an “antitrust law.” 
Rather, Congress’s concern for business arrangements that “restrain 
trade” can  “plainly” equate to a concern with arrangements that “reduce” 
trade, as the terms “restrain” and “reduce” are similar.  A normal result of 
arrangements that reduce trade or output,94 of course, is higher prices.95 
In addition, a contract, combination, or conspiracy that “restrains” trade 
can distort or change it, rather than simply diminish its size or quantity.  In 
other words, a “restraint” of trade also could distort the competitive array of 
offerings in the market, not just the market’s total output (which would 
affect market price).  Indeed, the antitrust statutes are not written in terms of 
the “price” effects of market power. 
The antitrust statutes focus instead on more general principles.  Section 1 
of the Sherman Act is concerned with arrangements in “restraint of trade,” 
not arrangements that “lead to higher prices.”  A fair reading of the 
Sherman Act suggests that every important element of trade—price, quality, 
variety, etc.—was meant to be the concern of the antitrust statutes.96 
 
 90. See, e.g., Ida M. Tarbell, The Rise of the Standard Oil Company, MCCLURE’S 
MAGAZINE, Dec. 1902, at 115–28. See generally RON CHERNOW, TITAN:  THE LIFE OF JOHN 
D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. (1998). 
 91. For an excellent and thorough analysis of the Standard Oil case, see James May, The 
Story of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, in ANTITRUST STORIES 7 (Eleanor M. Fox & 
Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007).  Professor May analyzed, inter alia, over 1,800 pages of briefs 
filed by both parties and informed the author of this Article that he never found an 
accusation by the Department of Justice that Standard Oil was inefficient, or an attempt by 
the government to condemn the company for being inefficient. Id. 
 92. See Lande, supra note 14, at 90–93. 
 93. Id. at 97–99. 
 94. Some conduct, such as price discrimination, might “restrain trade” even if it does not 
increase prices.  Price discrimination can change the terms and conditions of trade, but not 
reduce overall output. See Robert H. Lande, Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize 
Exclusionary Discounts?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 863, 880 (2006), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121473.  In addition, firms might fix prices at levels 
they claim are reasonable.  Since the prices were fixed, however, trade would be restrained 
even if the prices were set at a reasonable level. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United 
States, 175 U.S. 211, 234–37 (1899). 
 95. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 2, at 33.  Reduced output and higher prices are 
almost identical concepts.  Price discrimination is an exception, as shown in Lande, supra 
note 94, at 867–68. 
 96. As John Forrest Dillon noted in his 1890 treatise, JOHN FORREST DILLON, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 430 n.3 (4th ed. 1890):  “A 
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A concern with practices that raise prices also was suggested in an 1880 
common law “restraint of trade” case, Skrainka v. Scharringhausen.97  The 
case was concerned with the price effects of market power98 and, more 
specifically, with the transfer effects of higher prices:  “So, an association 
among all the proprietors of boats on the great canals of New York and 
Pennsylvania to keep up the price of freight and divide the profits has been 
held void.”99 
A price concern also was suggested in two of the earliest Sherman Act 
cases.  Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States100 held that the higher 
price would operate as a direct restraint upon the trade, and therefore any 
contract or combination that enhanced the price might in some degree 
restrain the trade in the article.101 
United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n similarly held: 
The natural and direct effect of the two agreements is the same, viz. to 
maintain rates at a higher level than would otherwise prevail . . . .  The 
natural, direct, and immediate effect of competition is, however, to lower 
rates, and to thereby increase the demand for commodities, the supplying 
of which increases commerce; and an agreement whose first and direct 
effect is to prevent this play of competition restrains, instead of 
promoting, trade and commerce.102 
 
monopoly exists when the sale of any merchandise or commodity is restrained to one or to a 
certain number; and it has three inseparable consequents—the increase of the price, the 
badness of the wares, the impoverishment of others.” Id. (citation omitted).  The 1601 
common law case, the Case of Monopolies, similarly held:  “The 2d (c) incident to a 
monopoly is, that after the monopoly granted, the commodity is not so good and 
merchantable as it was before . . . .” Darcy v. Allein [The Case of Monopolies], [1601] 77 
Eng Rep. 1260.  Normally antitrust can simply focus upon prices, an approach that prevents 
transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with market power, even though non-price 
competition is often crucial to consumer welfare.  This is because normally a market that is 
price competitive also will produce optimal non-price competition.  But this is not always 
true. See supra Part III.B. 
 97. 8 Mo. App. 522, 523 (1880). 
 98. Id. at 526. (“[T]he essential question is one of monopoly and of injury to the public.  
Where the grain-dealers of a whole town formed a secret combination to stifle all 
competition, and thus to control and keep up the price of grain:  that was held void.”). 
 99. Id.  However, the restraints in question only covered part of the market, so 
presumably the firms lacked market power and the restraints therefore should not be 
condemned under either a total welfare or a consumer welfare approach: 
The partial nature of the restraint in the case before us seems to be not colorable, 
but real.  The agreement is amongst the quarrymen of one district of one city, and 
it does not appear that it embraces all of them. There is no evidence that it works 
any public mischief, and the contract is not of such a nature that it is apparent from 
its terms that it tends to deprive men of employment, unduly raise prices, cause a 
monopoly, or put an end to competition.  It is limited both as to time and place; 
and we know of no case in recent times in which a contract such as the one before 
us has been declared illegal.  
Id. at 527. 
 100. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 101. Id. at 241. 
 102. 171 U.S. 505, 565, 577 (1898). 
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Of course, supracompetitive pricing leads to both allocative inefficiency 
and wealth transfers from consumers to firms with market power.103  Thus, 
if we equate “restrain trade” with a concern with higher prices, this does not 
help determine whether the statute embodies an allocative inefficiency 
concern, a wealth transfer concern, or both. 
Nevertheless, in most cases a price standard will be identical to a wealth 
transfer concern.104  Neither would, for example, permit a merger to a 
monopoly or a cartel that raised prices, even if permitting this would be net 
efficient.  An efficiency standard, by contrast, would permit mergers, joint 
ventures, and cartels leading to higher prices so long as the arrangement 
was net efficient.105  For this reason a “plain meaning” of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act would decide the first two hypotheticals in this Article the 
same way as the wealth transfer (stealing) approach.  Neither hypothetical, 
however, would be decided the correct way under an efficiency approach. 
A price concern is, moreover, consistent with the definitions of “restraint 
of trade” used in a contemporaneous legal treatise:  
§ 125.  What constitutes restraint of trade.  It certainly is not true that 
every contract which reduces competition or that restrains trade is illegal; 
. . .  The natural result of the sale of a railroad to a rival line destroys 
competition and generally restrains, that is, lessens traffic by increasing 
rates.  And the same could be said in every case where a merchant buys 
out his rivals and secures a monopoly in a town.106 
Another source did not use the exact phrase “restraint of trade,” but it did 
employ two close terms:  “Agreements tending to monopoly—i.e., ‘any 
combination among merchants to raise the price of merchandise, to the 
detriment of the public,’ are illegal.”107 
 
 103. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 2, at fig.1. 
 104. The price and wealth transfer standards are identical except when firms are able to 
practice certain forms of price discrimination. See Lande, supra note 94, at 884. 
 105. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 2, at 18–19. 
 106. See 1 THOMAS CARL SPELLING, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
144 (1892).  The treatise adds:  “There is substantial harmony between the English and 
American definitions of monopoly, the two countries agreeing that contracts entered into by 
and between two or more corporations, the necessary result of whose performance will crush 
and destroy competition, are illegal.” Id.; see also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 
1 (1895) (“It was further averred that the American Sugar Refining Company monopolized 
the manufacture and sale of refined sugar in the United States, and controlled the price of 
sugar; that in making the contracts, Searles and the American Sugar Refining Company 
combined and conspired with the other defendants to restrain trade and commerce in refined 
sugar among the several states and foreign nations, and that the said contracts were made 
with the intent to enable the American Sugar Refining Company to restrain the sale of 
refined sugar in Pennsylvania and among the several states, and to increase the regular price 
at which refined sugar was sold, and thereby to exact and secure large sums of money from 
the state of Pennsylvania, and from the other states of the United States, and from all other 
purchasers; and that the same was unlawful, and contrary to the said act.”).  
 107. CHARLES FISK BEACH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 112 
n.1 (1891). 
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For a similar concern with price in one of the earliest Sherman Act cases, 
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, the defendants were charged 
with unjustly raising prices.108    The case held: 
[T]he action of this corporation in establishing the rates to be charged 
largely influences the net profit coming to the farmer, the manufacturer, 
and the merchant, from the sale of the products of the farm, the workshop 
and manufactory, and of the merchandise purchased and resold, and also 
largely influences the price to be paid by everyone who consumes any of 
the property transported over the line of railway.109 
This 1897 case is especially significant because, in addition to a price 
concern, it recognizes and manifests concern with the transfer effects of 
market power (i.e., it condemns prices that “exact and procure great sums of 
money from the people” and is concerned with the “net profit coming to the 
farmer”).110  But it is not concerned with market power’s allocative 
inefficiency effects. 
In summary, section 1 of the Sherman Act’s prohibition against 
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies “in restraint of trade” was not 
directed at business arrangements that are inefficient.  Rather, a “restraint of 
trade” usually means a practice that restricts output and therefore raises 
prices.  When on-price competition is important, it means a practice that 
distorts some non-price aspect of consumer choice.  This plain reading of 
the term “restraint of trade” has been reinforced by an analysis of both some 
of the earliest antitrust cases and also contemporary legal treatises. 
3.  Section 2 of the Sherman Act:  A Concern that Supracompetitive Pricing 
Steals from Consumers 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act holds:  “Every person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty.”111  A 
search of contemporary sources for the key section 2 term, “monopolize” 
and the related term, “monopoly” found several definitions relevant to the 
efficiency/wealth transfer debate.  “A monopoly exists when the sale of any 
merchandise or commodity is restrained to one or to a certain number; and 
it has three inseparable consequents, the increase of the price, the badness 
of the wares, the impoverishment of others.”112 
Even though this treatise spoke of a “monopoly” rather than the verb “to 
monopolize,” it shows that in 1890 the wealth transfer effects of 
monopolies were well understood.  A contemporaneous treatise was even 
more explicitly focused on the transfer effects of market power and defined 
the word “monopolize” as follows: 
 
 108. 166 U.S. 290, 292 (1897).  
 109. Id. at 336. 
 110. Id. at 299, 336.  
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize . . . 
shall be deemed guilty . . . .”). 
 112. DILLON, supra note 96, at 430 n.3 (citation omitted). 
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In whatever there is opportunity for competition on equal terms, as in 
trading, insurance, banking and the like, there can be no valid objection to 
an unlimited number of corporations; but where the necessities of the 
public or geographical conformation have provided vantage points as in 
the business of transportation, furnishing light and water to cities and 
districts, and in certain manufactures the number which can operate 
within a given territory successfully is often restricted to one, and 
monopoly with the opportunity for oppression, extortion and 
accumulation of colossal wealth is a necessary consequence.113 
This source thus appeared to use “monopoly” and “monopolize” 
interchangeably.  By contrast, none of the nineteenth century sources 
seemed to be concerned with—or even aware of—the fact that monopoly 
pricing leads to allocative inefficiency. 
The conclusion that the wealth transfer effects of market power were a 
concern is reinforced by a plain reading analysis of pre-1890 state antitrust 
statutes.  Although many pre-1890 state antitrust statutes do not help clarify 
the issues, the preamble to the Florida law against monopolization114 
implies that the state’s General Assembly knew about monopolization’s 
transfer effects, but not its allocative inefficiency effects:  “An act to 
prevent during the existing war Monopolies, Extortions and Speculations in 
Bread-stuffs and other articles of general use and consumption, and to make 
such acts criminal, and to provide penalties for the same.”115  The use of the 
word “extortion” implies a concern over the transfer of wealth, not 
economic inefficiency.  This session law is similar in scope to an 1861 act 
of the General Assembly of Georgia which predates the Florida statute and 
could have served as its model.116  The Georgia statute further expanded on 
the extortion articulation stating that: 
Be it further enacted, That any person or persons who shall exact, 
demand, or receive exorbitant, unjust, or unreasonable prices for any of 
the articles enumerated in the foregoing sections of this Act, shall be 
guilty of the crime of extortion; and upon conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the Court; 
 
 113. SPELLING, supra note 106, at 20 (emphasis added). 
 114. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 217 (“A preamble, purpose clause, or 
recital is a permissible indicator of meaning.”).  Further, the provision contained in section 
two of “The Acts and Resolutions” of the General Assembly of Florida stated that: 
Be it further enacted, That all and every person or persons who shall monopolize 
any of the articles above mentioned, with intent to produce a scarcity of such 
article or articles in the market, or of raising the price or prices of such articles, or 
either of them, or if any person or persons shall purchase, procure, or receive any 
of the articles specified in the preceding section and hold the same for the purpose 
of engrossing the market and raising the price of such article or articles, such 
persons or persons so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon 
conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not less than five hundred dollars, nor 
exceeding five thousand dollars. 
Act of Nov. 17, 1862, ch. 1360, § 2, 1862 Fla. Laws 36, 36. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Act of Dec. 20, 1861, Pub. L. No. 62, § 2, 1861 Ga. Laws 66, 67. 
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the fine not to exceed one thousand dollars, and the imprisonment not to 
exceed six months.117 
The law’s references to “exorbitant, unjust, or unreasonable prices” 
verifies that in 1890 people understood and objected to what we today call 
the wealth transfer concern.  But this language has nothing to do with 
allocative inefficiency. 
This same theme emerged in pre–Sherman Act common law antitrust 
cases.  The 1601 case, Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies)118 noted 
the wealth transfer effects of monopolies in several ways: 
The sole trade of any . . . monopoly, is not only a damage and prejudice to 
those who exercise the same trade, but also to all other subjects, for the 
end of all these monopolies is for the private gain of the patentees . . . 
there are three inseparable incidents to every monopoly against the 
commonwealth, sc. 1.  That (e) the price of the same commodity will be 
raised . . . .119  
Further: 
The 2d (c) incident to a monopoly is, that after the monopoly granted, the 
commodity is not so good and merchantable as it was before:  for the 
patentee having the sole trade, regards only his private benefit, and not 
the common wealth.  3.  It (d) tends to the impoverishment of divers 
artificers and others . . . who now will of necessity be constrained to live 
in idleness and beggary . . . .120 
This passage contains four references to the transfer effects of 
monopolies and one to non-price effects.  Similarly, in the 1844 common 
law case of Evans v. Harlow,121 the defendant was charged with the offense 
of “monopolizing high prices at the expense of the public, by stating a 
falsehood.”122  The court recognized the wealth transfer effects of 
monopoly pricing by finding that the defendant that stated “that he [was] 
the sole inventor, manufacturer and patentee, thereby monopoliz[ed] high 
prices at the expense of the public.”123 
Similarly, The King v. Waddington,124 a common law case from 1800, 
also demonstrated judicial distaste for the transfer effects of monopolistic 
practices.  The case involved “[s]preading rumours with intent to [e]nhance 
the price of hops.”125  The court determined that it was a crime to:  “by 
undue means to enhance [the price] . . . that which the common law of the 
land has ordained for the protection of the poor, in preventing the 
advancing of the price of those commodities without which they cannot 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Darcy v. Allein (The Case of the Monopolies), [1601] 77 Eng. Rep. 1260. 
 119. Id. at 1263 (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
 121. [1844] 114 Eng. Rep. 1384. 
 122. Id. at 1386. 
 123. Id. at 1385 (emphasis added). 
 124. [1800] 102 Eng. Rep. 56. 
 125. Id. at 56. 
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exist.”126  The court focused its opinion on the importance of freedom of 
trade and that these laws have the goal of  “protecting the poor man against 
the avarice of the rich”127 and maintained that the law is necessary “[f]or 
the sake of the public, and especially of the poorer part of His Majesty’s 
subjects.”128  As a result, the common law was intended to remove “a 
temptation to rich men to speculate upon the price of the necessaries of life 
at the risk and expence of the poor.”129 
The same wealth transfer idea arose in the earliest Sherman Act Supreme 
Court cases.  The very first Sherman Act case to reach the Court, United 
States v. E.C. Knight Co.,130  made this point.  The majority opinion held 
that “when [a corporation] becomes a practical monopoly, to which the 
citizen is compelled to resort, and by means of which a tribute can be 
exacted from the community, []is subject to regulation by state legislative 
power.”131  The complaint over the transfer effects of market power also 
found its voice in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion:   
The influence of a lack of supply or a rise in the price of an article of such 
prime necessity cannot be measured.  It permeates the entire mass of 
community, and leaves few of its members untouched by its withering 
blight . . . .  “I take it,” said Gibson, J., “a combination is criminal 
whenever the act to be done has a necessary tendency to prejudice the 
public or to oppress individuals, by unjustly subjecting them to the power 
of the confederates, and giving effect to the purpose of the latter, whether 
of extortion or of mischief.”132  
The court further held, “Those interested in its operations will be satisfied 
with nothing less than to have the whole population of America pay tribute 
to them.”133  
In summary, evidence from contemporary legal treatises, pre-1890 State 
antitrust statutes, English common law cases, and some of the earliest 
Sherman Act cases all demonstrate that section 2 was concerned with the 
wealth transfer effects of monopoly power.  But there is no evidence of 
even an awareness that monopolies could be inefficient or that monopoly 
pricing could lead to allocative inefficiency. 
4.  Section 2 of the Sherman Act:  A No-Fault Monopoly Statute 
A textualist analysis of section 2 of the Sherman Act leads to a startling 
result.  Under a textualist approach, section 2 should be interpreted to 
prohibit all monopolies, not just monopolies acquired by anticompetitive 
 
 126. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 65. 
 130. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 131. See id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. at 26–27 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). Similarly, a district court in an 1891 case, American 
Biscuit & Manuf’g Co. v. Klotz, similarly complained about “the prices [that] would be in 
danger of being arbitrarily and exorbitantly fixed.” 44 F. 721, 725 (E.D. La. 1891). 
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conduct.134  The Sherman Act should not contain an exception for efficient 
monopolists or firms that achieved their monopoly by historical accident. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits anyone who shall “monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize.”135  The statute never defines “monopolize” and 
uses it in place of the more straightforward term “monopoly.”  It is difficult 
to know whether “monopolize” was intended to mean the same as 
“monopoly,” was meant to be a broader or narrower term, or simply has a 
different meaning.  The statute’s prohibition against firms that 
“monopolize” could have been meant to encompass only the subset of 
conduct that creates a monopoly through anticompetitive means (the current 
legal requirement for a section 2 violation).136  However, a “plain meaning” 
textualist approach leads to a broader meaning:  a firm illegally 
“monopolizes” if it was either a monopoly at the time of the suit, or if it was 
in the process of acquiring a monopoly.  The statute contains no exception 
for a monopoly acquired through superior efficiency. 
During the Sherman Act’s legislative debates, just before the final vote, 
Senator Edmunds defined the term “monopolize.” Although normally a 
textualist approach would not care about anything uttered during a 
Congressional debate, Senator Edmund’s remarks should be significant 
even to a textualist because he said that Congress should employ in the 
Sherman Act the meaning of “monopolize” in a well-known contemporary 
dictionary: 
I have only to say . . . that this subject was not lightly considered in the 
committee, and that we studied it with whatever little ability we had, and 
the best answer I can make to both my friends is to read from Webster’s 
Dictionary the definition of the verb ‘to monopolize’:  1.  To purchase or 
obtain possession of the whole of, as a commodity or goods in market, 
with the view to appropriate or control the exclusive sale of; as, to 
monopolize sugar or tea . . . .  2.  To engross or obtain by any means the 
exclusive right of, especially the right of trading to any place, or with any 
country or district . . . .137 
 
 134. The author of this article is not advocating a no-fault approach to monopoly.  This is, 
however, the logical result of a textualist analysis. 
 135. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 136. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 137. 21 CONG. REC. 3153 (1890).  This is part of an exchange that took place at the very 
end of the Sherman Act debates.  Although the following would not interest a textualist 
because it is a legislative debate, it would interest a traditionalist because it constitutes the 
only known references in the debates to the issue of whether all monopolies should be found 
to be in violation of the statute.  Senator Kenna asked:   
Is it intended by the committee, as the section seems to indicate, that if an 
individual . . . by his own skill and energy, by the propriety of his conduct 
generally, shall pursue his calling in such a way as to monopolize a trade, his 
action shall be a crime under this proposed act? 
He continued:   
Suppose a citizen of Kentucky is dealing in shorthorn cattle and by virtue of his 
superior skill in that particular product it turns out that he is the only one in the 
United States to whom an order comes from Mexico for cattle of that stock for a 
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considerable period, so that he is conceded to have a monopoly of that trade with 
Mexico; is it intended by the committee that the bill shall make that man a culprit?   
Id. at 3151.  
  Senator Edmunds gave a direct response to Senator Kenna’s hypothetical:   
[I]n the case stated the gentleman has not any monopoly at all . . . he has not got 
the possession of all the horned cattle in the United States.  He has not done 
anything but compete with his adversaries in trade, if he had any, to furnish the 
commodity for the lowest price.  So I assure my friend he need not be disturbed 
upon that subject.   
Id. at 3151–52.  Senator Edmund’s response indicates that he believed that no 
monopolization was involved in the hypothetical, so he did not really consider the need for 
an exception for a firm that achieved its monopoly solely by superior skill. 
  Senator Hoar then gave his answer:   
[I]n the case put by [Senator Kenna, if] . . . a man who merely by superior skill and 
intelligence, a breeder of horses or raiser of cattle, or manufacturer or artisan of 
any kind, got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he could 
was not a monopolist, [unless] it involved something like the use . . . [of unfair] 
competition like the engrossing, the buying up of all other persons engaged in the 
same business.  
Id. at 3152. 
  Senator Edmunds then provided the final answer to Senator Kenna’s question:   
I have only to say . . . that this subject was not lightly considered in the committee, 
and that we studied it with whatever little ability we had, and the best answer I can 
make to both my friends is to read from Webster’s Dictionary the definition of the 
verb ‘to monopolize’:  1.  To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of, as a 
commodity or goods in market, with the view to appropriate or control the 
exclusive sale of; as, to monopolize sugar or tea. Like the sugar trust.  One man, if 
he had capital enough, could do it just as well as two.  2.  To engross or obtain by 
any means the exclusive right of, especially the right of trading to any place, or 
with any country or district; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade . . . .  [W]e 
were not blind to the very suggestions which have been made, and we thought we 
had done the right thing in providing, in the very phrase we did, that if one person 
instead of two, by a combination, of one person alone, as we have heard about the 
wheat market in Chicago, for instance, did it, it was just as offensive and injurious 
to the public interest as if two had combined to do it.   
Id. 
  The Sherman Act, forbidding any person to “monopolize” or “attempt to 
monopolize” was then passed by the Senate. Id. at 3153. 
  This crucial segment of the debate deserves careful consideration.  Senators Hoar 
and Edmunds provided opposite answers to Senator Kenna’s question.  Senator Hoar clearly 
did not consider a firm to be guilty of “monopolization” if it “got the whole business” by 
skill and efficiency alone.  Senator Edmunds, however, defined “to monopolize” as merely 
“[t]o engross or obtain by any means.”  Edmunds intended that “if one person . . . did it, it 
was just as offensive and injurious to the public interest as if two had combined to do it.”  
Edmunds clearly condemned every monopoly, although by his first response he did not 
consider the hypothetical situation given to describe a monopoly.  Thus, it would appear that 
these statement should be construed as offsetting one another, although, if a judgment had to 
be made, since Senator Edmunds spoke last and was one of the main sponsors of the bill, his 
statements could perhaps be said to carry greater weight.  The fact that this discussion took 
place at the very end of the Sherman Act debate also could very well mean that it embodied 
Congress’s final view on the subject.  However, these statements were also less able to be 
corrected or opposed by Senator Sherman or other legislators. 
  It should be emphasized, however, that this exchange in this footnote would not be 
of interest to a textualist because it consists of legislative debate. 
  Nevertheless, if the main thrust of the statute is kept in mind, including  Congress’s 
basic condemnation of monopoly pricing despite a potential sacrifice of efficiency, the 
Sherman Act does not appear to provide an exception for an efficient monopolist. 
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This shows that “monopolize” simply meant to acquire a monopoly.  The 
definition was not restricted to acquisitions through anticompetitive 
conduct. 
Moreover, as Justice Scalia reminds us in Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, no 
exception should be read into a statute unless it is explicitly contained in the 
statute.138  Indeed a pre–Sherman Act Webster’s Dictionary139 contains a 
definition of “Monopolize” that is virtually identical to the dictionary 
definition read on the Senate floor by Senator Edmund: 
1.  To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of any commodity or 
goods in the market with the view of selling them at advanced prices, and 
of having the power of commanding the prices; as, to monopolize sugar or 
tea. 
2.  To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right of trading to any 
place, and the sole power of vending any commodity or goods in a 
particular place or country; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade. 
3.  To obtain the whole; as, to monopolize advantages.140 
This is virtually the same as the definition of monopolize in another 
contemporary source, a legal treatise from 1889: 
To monopolize, as defined by Webster, is, 1.  To purchase or obtain 
possession of the whole of any commodity or goods in the market, with 
the view of selling them at advanced prices, and having the power to 
command the prices.  2.  To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive 
right of trading to any place, and the sole power of vending any 
commodity or goods in a particular place or country.141 
These definitions of “monopolize” include all monopolies, even those 
acquired through superior efficiency.  Like the text of section 2, they 
contain no exceptions.  Thus, a textualist analysis of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act shows that any firm that gains a monopoly commits the 
offense of “monopolization,” and there should be no exception for a firm 
that acquires its monopoly by efficient methods.  Today’s prevailing legal 
standard142 is simply inconsistent with a textualist or plain meaning reading 
of the statute:  the Sherman Act condemns all monopolies. 
Indeed, the earliest Sherman Act cases used the terms “monopolize” and  
“monopoly” interchangeably.  For example, E.C. Knight Co. was concerned 
with “monopoly” despite the statutory language of “monopolize”: 
[Held], that the result of the transaction complained of was the creation of 
a monopoly in the manufacture of a necessary of life . . . “to protect trade 
and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,” . . . . “The 
 
 138. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 579 (1940). 
 139. See 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1828). 
 140. Id. at 727. 
 141. SANFORD MOON GREEN, CRIME:  NATURE, CAUSES, TREATMENT, AND PREVENTS 308 
(1889) (emphasis omitted). 
 142. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
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fundamental question is whether, conceding that the existence of a 
monopoly in manufacture is established by the evidence, that monopoly 
can be directly suppressed under the act of Congress in the mode 
attempted by this bill. . . .  [I]n other words, when it becomes a practical 
monopoly, to which the citizen is compelled to resort and by means of 
which a tribute can be exacted from the community,—is subject to 
regulation by state legislative power.143 
Similarly, an 1891 district court case, American Biscuit & Manuf’g Co. v. 
Klotz,144 held: 
[T]he law-maker has used the word [monopolize] to mean “to aggregate” 
or  “concentrate” in the hands of few, practically, and, as a matter of fact, 
and according to the known results of human action, to the exclusion of 
others . . . .  Now it is to be observed that these statutes outline an offense, 
but require for its complete commission no ulterior motive, such as to 
defraud, etc . . . .145 
This court thus appeared to expressly reject the need for anticompetitive 
conduct.  The opinion continued: 
The offense is defined to “combine in the form of trust, or otherwise, in 
restraint of trade or commerce,” and “to monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, any of the trade or commerce.” To compass either of these 
things, with no other motive than to compass them, and by any means, 
constitutes the offense.146 
The terms “monopolize” and “monopoly” were thus used 
interchangeably, with no exception for an efficiently acquired monopoly or 
a monopoly acquired by historical accident.  As the Court noted in the 1897 
case, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, no exceptions to the 
antitrust statutes should be implied: 
In other words, we are asked to read into the act, by way of judicial 
legislation, an exception that is not placed there by the lawmaking branch 
of the Government, and this is to be done upon the theory that the 
impolicy of such legislation is so clear that it cannot be supposed 
Congress intended the natural import of the language it used.  This we 
cannot and ought not to do . . . .  These considerations are, however, not 
for us.  If the act ought to read as contended for by defendants, Congress 
is the body to amend it and not this Court, by a process of judicial 
legislation wholly unjustifiable.147 
As noted earlier, when Justice Scalia authored the opinion in Trinko he 
did not undertake a textualist analysis of section 2.148  He simply cited 
 
 143. Id. at 6, 10–11. 
 144. 44 F. 721 (C.C.E.D. La. 1891). 
 145. Id. at 724–25. 
 146. Id. at 725. 
 147. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897).  The Court also 
held that “no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that which has 
been omitted by Congress.” Id. at 328. 
 148. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004). 
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precedent for his assertion that the Sherman Act contains an exception for a 
monopolist that gained its monopoly through superior efficiency.149  Justice 
Scalia has written that he does respect precedent and stare decisis, and this 
could explain his approach to the issues in Trinko.150 
Nevertheless, the pro-monopoly tone of Scalia’s language in Trinko went 
much further than that of any other Supreme Court monopolization opinion.  
Until Trinko, the prevailing standard was merely the 1966 Grinnell 
requirement of “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”151  This approach does not 
come close to the extensive stridently pro-monopoly language of Trinko.152  
Moreover, before United States v. Grinnell Corp.,153 the approach from 
United States v. Alcoa prevailed;154 the Alcoa opinion, although opaque and 
extremely difficult to understand, is best interpreted as a no-fault monopoly 
standard—all monopolies are illegal.155 
Elsewhere, Justice Scalia has denounced the type of expansion of 
precedent he undertook in Trinko.156  Moreover, in the recent Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. decision,157 Justice Scalia 
voted to overturn precedent from 1911 that the Supreme Court in two 
decisions (opinions that Justice Scalia joined!) had reconsidered but 
ultimately declined to overturn.158  In his dissenting opinion in Leegin, 
 
 149. Scalia wrote:  “It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, ‘the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of 
a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’” Id. at 407 (quoting United States 
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)). 
 150. See supra note 84. 
 151. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71. 
 152. Compare the Grinnell language, in note 136 supra, with Scalia’s language in Trinko:   
  The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of 
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-
market system.  The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short 
period—is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking 
that produces innovation and economic growth.  To safeguard the incentive to 
innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is 
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct. 
  Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that 
renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.  Compelling such firms to 
share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose 
of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or 
both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.  Enforced sharing also 
requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, 
quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited. 
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08. 
 153. 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
 154. See 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 155. See id. 
 156. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1369 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(decrying “sub silentio expansion” of substantive precedent). 
 157. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 158. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto Co. 
v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
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much of Justice Breyer’s focus was on how the 1911 precedent should be 
upheld on the basis of stare decisis.159  It is this precedent that Justice Scalia 
ignored when he joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion, perhaps because 
adherence to stare decisis did not yield Scalia’s preferred approach to 
antitrust law. 
Why did Justice Scalia avoid undertaking a textualist analysis in Trinko, 
but instead used the opportunity to move the law of monopolization even 
further away from the result that a textualist analysis of this issue would 
have produced?  Could the explanation be that a textualist interpretation 
would have led to a result—no exception for monopolists that gained their 
monopoly without undertaking anticompetitive conduct—contrary to his 
policy preferences? 
5.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
The core of section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers the effect of 
which “may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a 
monopoly.”160  A textualist or “plain meaning” analysis of section 7 
straightforwardly leads to the conclusion that if a merger “may be 
substantially”161 likely to lead to a monopoly, or to “tend to lessen 
 
 159. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 918 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer states:  
We write, not on a blank slate, but on a slate that begins with Dr. Miles and goes 
on to list a century’s worth of similar cases, massive amounts of advice that 
lawyers have provided their clients, and untold numbers of business decisions 
those clients have taken in reliance upon that advice . . . .  Those who wish this 
Court to change so well-established a legal precedent bear a heavy burden of 
proof.  I am not aware of any case in which this Court has overturned so well-
established a statutory precedent.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
With the preceding discussion in mind, I would consult the list of factors that our 
case law indicates are relevant when we consider overruling an earlier case.  
Justice Scalia, writing separately in another of our cases this Term, well 
summarizes that law.  And every relevant factor he mentions argues against 
overruling Dr. Miles here. 
Id. at 923 (citations omitted). 
In sum, every stare decisis concern this Court has ever mentioned counsels against 
overruling here.  It is difficult for me to understand how one can believe both that 
(1) satisfying a set of stare decisis concerns justifies overruling a recent 
constitutional decision, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., (Scalia, J., joined by 
Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), but 
(2) failing to satisfy any of those same concerns nonetheless permits overruling a 
longstanding statutory decision. Either those concerns are relevant or they are not 
. . . .  All ordinary stare decisis considerations indicate the contrary.  For these 
reasons, with respect, I dissent. 
Id. at 929 (citation omitted). 
 160. See Clayton Act of 1914 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 161. The “may be substantially” language gives rise to the merger incipiency doctrine.  
For an explanation of this doctrine, see Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency:  From 
Von’s Grocery to Consumer Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (2001), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134815. 
 2382 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
competition,”162 the merger should be blocked.  The statute contains no 
exception for a merger likely to create an efficient monopoly, so none 
should be read into section 7.  Just as section 2 of the Sherman Act contains 
no exception for a firm that efficiently “monopolizes,” section 7 of the 
Clayton Act contains no exception for a merger that produces an efficient 
“monopoly.”  Nor should an exception be implied for the second part of the 
statute:  if competition is likely to be impaired enough that prices are likely 
to rise, the merger should be prohibited. 
As Professor Williamson first demonstrated, it certainly is possible that a 
merger could lead to a monopoly that would raise prices, yet be net 
efficient.163  Professor Williamson analyzed horizontal mergers using an 
approach that balanced efficiencies and showed how mergers might lead 
simultaneously to higher prices and also to cost savings.  He showed how 
the allocative inefficiency caused by merger’s supracompetitive pricing 
might well be more than offset by cost savings caused by the merger.164  
Under an efficiency approach, these mergers should be permitted even 
though both the cost savings and the transfer resulting from the higher 
prices would accrue to the monopolist.  As the following diagram 
illustrates: 
 
Figure 1:  Standard Monopoly Power Diagram 
 
An efficiency approach would compare the allocative inefficiency 
triangle, A1, with the productive efficiency gain (cost savings), the lower 
left rectangle A2. The merger should be blocked only if the triangle is larger 
than the rectangle, because only these mergers are net inefficient. Under a 
wealth transfer approach, however, any merger likely to lead to higher 
prices to consumers should be blocked. This means that if the postmerger 
firm “may be substantially” likely to raise prices and therefore to give rise 
to the existence of the upper rectangle, W (the wealth transfer effect of 
 
 162. The “tend to create a monopoly” language also gives rise to the merger incipiency 
doctrine. Id. at 876. 
 163. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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market power), the merger should be blocked. With only those few 
exceptions when non-price considerations would be crucial, 165 an approach 
that prevented these wealth transfers would be identical to a “price” 
approach. 
A “plain meaning” approach should essentially equate “may be 
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly” with a 
reasonable probability166 of higher prices to consumers.  The same result 
would arise if we focused on either the “may be substantially to lessen 
competition” or the “tend to create a monopoly” part of the statute.  “Lessen 
competition” is the same as or similar to a concern with supracompetitive 
prices.  “Tend to create a monopoly” also gives rise to the same concern.  
For either half of the statute, a textualist or plain meaning analysis would 
mean that any merger likely to lead to higher prices should be blocked 
without exception.  A textualist analysis of the Clayton Act would lead to a 
price standard with no exception for an efficient monopolist created by 
merger under either of this statute’s two tests. 
Indeed, this plain meaning of the statute is consistent with the definitions 
contained in a roughly contemporaneous source:  “Agreements tending to 
monopoly—i.e., ‘any combination among merchants to raise the price of 
merchandise, to the detriment of the public,’ are illegal.”167 
The only way the antimerger statutes could be read to permit a net 
efficient merger to monopoly would be a procrustean argument:  terms like 
“lessen competition” and “tend to create a monopoly” are almost infinitely 
malleable terms of art that we are for some reason going to equate to 
“efficiency,” so we are going to creates an exception for efficiency creating 
mergers.  This would, however, be the very opposite of a “plain meaning” 
or textualist analysis.  Although terms like “competition” and “monopolize” 
are indeed ambiguous, a “plain meaning” analysis of a statute that prohibits 
mergers that may “substantially lessen competition” or “tend to create a 
monopoly” should not be read as a codeword for a system that permits 
mergers to monopoly so long as they are net efficient.  The antimerger 
statute contains no exceptions. 
6.  Implications From the “History of the Times”168 
If there were any doubts about Congress’s overriding desire to protect 
consumers from being forced to paying supracompetitive prices to firms 
with market power, it is noteworthy that when the Sherman Act was passed 
in 1890 even economists were barely aware of the concept we today call 
 
 165. See 15 U.S.C. § 18.  For exceptions, see infra Part III.B, explaining the use of the 
“choice” approach when non-price competition is important. 
 166. For a much more detailed explanation of how likely it must be that the merger raise 
prices and an analysis of the merger incipiency doctrine, see supra note 161. 
 167. BEACH, supra note 107, at 112 (quoting Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 
N.Y. 558, 559 (1877)). 
 168. For Justice Scalia’s use of the “history of the times” to determine the meaning of 
statutes, see supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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“allocative inefficiency.”169  In fact, the allocative inefficiency triangle that 
modern members of the antitrust community see so often (illustrated in Part 
III.B.5 above) never appeared in the 1890 edition of Alfred Marshall’s 
famous and pathbreaking Principles of Economics treatise.170  Further, 
although contemporary economists were familiar with this concept,171 there 
is no reason to believe they had any influence on the passage of the 
Sherman Act.172 
Even though Congress’s main complaint about the trusts of the late 1800s 
was not that they caused allocative inefficiency, could Congress primarily 
have been concerned with corporate productive efficiency?  Did Congress 
pass the Sherman Act primarily to save corporate costs and increase 
corporate productive efficiency?  For example, did Congress or the public 
in effect denounce Rockefeller because Standard Oil was so inefficient at 
producing oil? 
As noted in Part I.B.2, a search found no evidence Rockefeller was ever 
even accused of inefficiently running Standard Oil.173  Nor did the 
government, when it prosecuted the Standard Oil trust, ever assert that the 
company was inefficient, or that it violated the Sherman Act because it was 
inefficient.174  On the contrary, the trusts were among the most efficient 
corporations of their times.175 
This examination of the history of the times leaves the consumer 
protection explanation as that which is most consistent with the evidence.  
Congressional anger over perceived176 higher prices meant Congress was 
concerned about consumers paying more to trusts, monopolies, and cartels.  
Neither of the efficiency explanations (congressional anger in 1890 because 
higher prices caused allocative inefficiency, or congressional anger because 
the Rockefellers of the day were inefficient at production) is consistent with 
the history of the times.177 
 
 169. It was not until 1938 that the first modern and rigorous discussion of allocative 
efficiency appeared. See Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of 
Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, in 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938). 
 170. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890).  Although he devoted 
seventeen pages of the 1890 edition of this landmark treatise to “The Theory of 
Monopolies,” only one footnote included a reference to the concept, and the allocative 
inefficiency triangle we know so well today was not drawn anywhere in this book. Id. at 466 
n.1. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 200 (1965) (“The Sherman Act was framed and debated in the pre-expert era, when 
economists as a professional group were not directly consulted by the legislators.  But even 
if they had been, they would have given mixed and uncertain advice.”). 
 173. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.  
 174. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.  
 175. See Lande, supra note 14, at 90–93. 
 176. While Congress perceived that the trusts of the period were raising prices, the actual 
situation is much more complex. Id. at 97–98. 
 177. As a double check, I challenge each reader of this article to find ten intelligent 
friends and ask each:  “Why might Congress have condemned cartels for raising prices?”  I 
strongly doubt that any of them—other than friends with antitrust or economics training—
would guess that the main problem with cartels is that they cause economic inefficiency.  
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In sum, a textualist analysis shows that the key antitrust terms are either  
ambiguous,178 or help support the primacy of the wealth transfer goal for 
antitrust.  Nothing from the historical record, by contrast, fairly can be 
interpreted as suggesting that the antitrust statutes are only concerned with 
efficiency. 
II.  THE ALLOCATIVE INEFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF MARKET POWER:  
SMALL AND UNDULY DIFFICULT FOR PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE 
If the antitrust laws were interpreted so that their sole goal is to enhance 
economic efficiency, the principal problem with market power would be its 
effects on allocative inefficiency.179  The allocative inefficiency effects of 
market power, however, are relatively small.  They are also extremely 
difficult for plaintiffs to prove in court.  For these reasons, an antitrust 
regime centered around the prevention of allocative inefficiency would be 
unduly weak, perhaps so weak that the antitrust laws would cease to 
function effectively. 
A.  The Relatively Small Size of Allocative Inefficiency Compared to the 
Transfer Effects of Market Power180 
The manner in which the standard competition-to-monopoly diagram is 
drawn makes the allocative inefficiency effects of market power appear to 
be half as large as its transfer effects.181  Judge Easterbrook, for example, 
drew a similar diagram, made a number of conventional and commonly 
used assumptions, and on this basis showed that allocative inefficiency is 
50 percent as large as the transfer effects on average.182 
 
The author has asked his antitrust law students these questions on many occasions, and the 
students always find the efficiency explanations implausible. 
 178. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition.” See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a)(1) (2006).  Its language does not clarify whether this law’s principle concern is with 
efficiency, wealth transfers, consumer choice, or with something else.  However, a “plain 
reading” of this statute fairly suggests that the term “unfair” must include more than 
“economic efficiency.”  Congress did not, after all, enact a statute that prohibits “inefficient 
methods of competition.”  However, I have been unable to track down contemporaneous 
sources that further clarify the meaning of the term “unfair methods of competition,” other 
than sources used in a traditionalist analysis of the legislative history.  For these sources, see 
Lande, supra note 14, at 106–51. 
 179. In addition, there also could be instances where a merger, for example, would 
diminish innovation, and diminished innovation is another form of inefficiency.  For a 
discussion of this issue, see Averitt & Lande, supra note 10, at 240.  Second, it is possible 
that wealth that normally would be acquired by the firm with market power instead would be 
transformed into inefficient rent-seeking behavior.  This is sometimes called the Posnerian 
Costs of monopoly. See Lande, supra note 14, at 78–79 n.54. 
 180. This section is based upon John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels As Rational 
Business Strategy:  Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427 (2012), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917657. 
 181. See supra fig.1. 
 182. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445, 455 
(1985).  As Judge Easterbrook observed, the two-to-one ratio depends upon the assumptions 
of linear demand and supply, and “[t]hese curves doubtless are not linear, but legal rules 
must be derived from empirical guesses rather than exhaustive investigation.” Id.  
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If Judge Easterbrook were correct, this would mean that “what’s wrong” 
with market power—a crucial issue in an antitrust world that often trades 
off anticompetitive and procompetitive effects—would be tripled if the 
transfer effects of market power were added to its allocative inefficiency 
effects, and both were considered to be anticompetitive.  It is, however, 
extremely unlikely that the allocative inefficiency from market power is on 
average half as large as its transfer effects. 
The evidence shows that allocative inefficiency effects of market power 
are on average much smaller relative to the transfer effects.  Unfortunately, 
we do not know for a statistically significant number of typical cartels or 
monopolies how large either effect is.  My coauthor on another project, 
Prof. John Connor, surveyed the literature on the relative sizes of the 
allocative inefficiency and transfer effects of market power.  He calculated 
a representative ratio or range based on economic theory and the best 
empirical literature on cartels and monopolies.  Dr. Connor also was able to 
locate a number of technically impressive empirical studies of monopolies 
and cartels that provided both estimates, and he also made estimates based 
upon a number of relatively realistic theoretical assumptions.183 
Dr. Connor found that on average the allocative inefficiency effects are 
probably only 3 percent to 20 percent as large as the transfer effects.184 
There’s an alternative way to phrase this finding.  If you start with the 
inefficiency effects of market power and then include its transfer effects, 
“what’s wrong” with market power would increase by at least a factor of 
five, and maybe even by a factor of thirty-three.  Conversely, if the transfer 
effects are not counted, the allocative inefficiency effects of market usually 
would be so small they usually would be outweighed by even a tiny cost 
savings.185 
 
 183. An earlier estimate of these ratios, albeit for the economy as a whole, was calculated 
in F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 667–78 (3d ed. 1990).  They evaluated and compared empirical estimates of 
the relative sizes of the deadweight loss (0.5 to 2.0 percent of GNP) and transfer effects 
(probably at the lower end of the range of 3 to 12 percent) due to the exercise of market 
power in the whole U.S. economy in the 1950s to 1970s.  Economy-wide analyses tend to 
produce lower welfare losses than do disaggregated industry studies, but the effect on the 
ratio of interest is uncertain. See id. at 664.  Despite the many caveats expressed by Scherer 
and Ross about these numbers, their average deadweight loss/transfer ratio appears to be 
roughly 28 percent.  The lowest ratio is perhaps about 8 percent and the highest 36 percent. 
  An efficiency approach that ignored the wealth transfer effects of market power 
would tend to permit mergers and even collusion in markets with inelastic demand, such as 
insulin.  By contrast, markets for luxury goods would tend to have demand that is much 
more elastic.  Market power in these markets would thus tend to produce larger amounts of 
allocative inefficiency.  Ironically, an efficiency based antitrust policy would tend to permit 
price increases for necessities and be more likely to challenge higher prices for nonessential 
goods! See Email from Sandeep Vaheesan to Robert H. Lande (Feb. 13, 2013, 10:30 a.m. 
EST) (on file with author). 
 184. See Connor & Lande, supra note 180 at 460. 
 185. For the particular requirements, see supra note 2. 
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B.  The Very Heavy Burden of Demonstrating Allocative Inefficiency Would 
Be on the Enforcers 
My recent search for U.S. federal antitrust cases that calculated the 
allocative efficiency effects of market power found no positive results.186  
Apparently there has been only one U.S.187 case that has even claimed to 
attempt this undertaking in a published opinion, United States v. BNS 
Inc.188  This case purported to calculate the allocative inefficiency losses 
(also known as the deadweight welfare losses) as follows: 
 If the injunction thwarts the takeover, the injunction will deprive BNS 
of  ownership and control of a company that BNS has calculated to be 
worth at least $420,000,000 more than the preexisting market value.  This 
is irreparable harm.  The injunction will deprive Koppers’ shareholders of 
a premium in the same amount.  This is irreparable harm. . . .  The reason 
is that BNS is confident it can make Koppers more productive, and hence 
more profitable, than Koppers is on its own . . . .  Assuming BNS is 
successful, the takeover is efficient in that it transfers assets to new 
owners who can deploy them more productively—to the extent that the 
nation’s economic welfare will increase by upwards of $420,000,000.  
. . . .  
 The injunction imperils the takeover and so threatens to choke off this 
large increase in economic welfare.  In addition, the injunction will set a 
precedent that may discourage efficient transfers of control in the future. 
. . . .  The public interest in efficient transfers relates to a possible 
deadweight loss in the economy of $420,000,000.  The balance of 
hardships weighs heavily against Koppers—against the injunction.  The 
district court abused its discretion by granting the injunction.189 
However, the $420 million potential gain discussed in this case almost 
certainly does not constitute a true deadweight loss.  Rather, it appears to be 
 
 186. On September 14, 2012, Robert Pool searched Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Bloomberg 
for cases containing “antitrust” or “Sherman Act” and also containing “allocative 
efficiency,” “allocative inefficiency,” or “deadweight loss” or “deadweight welfare loss.”  
His searches found 74, 68, and 72 cases, respectively.  None of these cases calculated the 
size of the allocative inefficiency.  A 1991 article similarly reported that allocative 
inefficiency had never been awarded in an antitrust case. David C. Hjelmfelt & Channing D. 
Strother, Jr., Antitrust Damages for Consumer Welfare Loss, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 505 
(1991). 
 187. There also was a Canadian antitrust case that calculated the size of the allocative 
inefficiency effects of market power.  The allocative inefficiency was found to be roughly 
1/14 as large as the transfer effects of the market power in question (3 million versus 43 
million Canadian dollars). See Alan A. Fisher, Robert H. Lande & Stephen F. Ross, 
Legalizing Merger to Monopoly and Higher Prices:  The Canadian Competition Tribunal 
Gets It Wrong, 15 ANTITRUST MAGAZINE, no. 1, 2000, available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1358448.  The Canadian Competition Tribunal predicted a 
proposed propane merger would raise prices by 8 percent, which came to $43 million, and 
also produce another $3 million in allocative inefficiency losses (a 7 percent ratio). Id.  The 
anticipated allocative inefficiency of approximately $3 million was approximately 0.5 
percent of the combined firms’ anticipated annual sales of $585 million. Id. 
 188. 848 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 189. Id. at 953 (footnote omitted). 
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a control premium, a potential productive efficiency gain, a potential 
savings in X efficiency, and/or potential monopoly profits.  None of these is 
the same as the allocative inefficiency effects of market power. 
Strikingly, however, there is a line of cases, beginning with Rebel Oil Co. 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,190 which holds that an act is anticompetitive only 
when it harms allocative efficiency—and raises prices: 
Accordingly, an act is deemed anticompetitive under the Sherman Act 
only when it harms both allocative efficiency and raises the prices of 
goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality.191 
It is difficult to know what is meant by the requirement that to be 
anticompetitive an act both raise price and harm allocative inefficiency.  
One possibility is that the court is using a pure efficiency standard and 
wants to be clear that plaintiff must demonstrate more than 
supracompetitive prices:  it must demonstrate that the higher prices result in 
allocative inefficiency, not just a transfer of wealth to the alleged violator.  
Alternatively, the court might have in mind a practice such as RPM, which 
can raise prices for reasons that can be explained by efficiencies.192  In 
these circumstances the RPM would cause higher prices, yet be efficient.  
Or the court could simply be using the terms in an imprecise manner. 
Regardless, a number of cases that follow Rebel Oil explicitly place the 
burden of proving the allocative inefficiency harms of market power on 
plaintiffs.  For example, Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.193 held: 
The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating damage to competition with 
“specific factual allegations.”  Actual anticompetitive effects include, but 
are not limited to, reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in 
quality.  Higher prices alone are not the “epitome” of anticompetitive 
harm (as Jacobs claims).  Rather, consumer welfare, understood in the 
sense of allocative efficiency, is the animating concern of the Sherman 
Act . . . .  By “anticompetitive,” the law means that a given practice both 
harms allocative efficiency and could “raise[ ] the prices of goods above 
competitive levels or diminish[ ] their quality,” in addition to other 
possible anticompetitive effects such as those above.194 
 
 190. 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Hilton v. Children’s Hosp. San Diego, 
315 F. App’x 607, 609 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he antitrust laws are only concerned with acts 
that harm ‘allocative efficiency and raise[] the price of goods above their competitive level 
or diminish[] their quality.’” (quoting Poolwater Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1034 
(9th Cir. 2001))); see also Tunis Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 728 (3d Cir. 1992); 
Nelson v. Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1564 (7th Cir. 1991); In re NCAA I-A 
Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2005) 
(“Generally, the test for harm to competition is whether consumer welfare has been harmed 
such that there has been a decrease in allocative efficiency and an increase in price.”). 
 191. Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433; cf. Brook Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223–24 (1993) (below-cost pricing is not anticompetitive in itself 
because, although it causes allocative inefficiency, it brings lower aggregate prices in the 
market). 
 192. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 193. 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 194. Id. at 1339 (citations omitted). 
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Additionally, consider United National Maintenance, Inc. v. San Diego 
Convention Center Corp.195: 
Plaintiff must show Defendant’s conduct “harms consumer welfare,” i.e., 
“it harms both allocative efficiency and raises the price of goods above 
competitive levels or diminishes their quality.”  Allocative inefficiency 
occurs when market participants who can use resources most efficiently 
lack access to those resources because of a defendant’s conduct.196 
Thus, the enforcers and private plaintiffs’ task of demonstrating the 
allocative inefficiency effects of market power would lead antitrust into 
virtually uncharted waters that no plaintiff has ever navigated successfully, 
with the burden of proof on plaintiffs.  Because proof of the allocative 
inefficiency effects of market power has virtually never been accomplished 
successfully in an antitrust case, it is difficult to know how often the 
enforcers would be able to demonstrate its existence or magnitude in 
litigation settings. 
C.  An Efficiency Balancing Is Likely To Be Unduly Complex Compared to 
a Price (or Wealth Transfer or Stealing) Test197 
A wealth transfer or “price to consumers” approach has another 
advantage over an economic efficiency standard.  The price standard is 
more workable because its modeling is more straightforward.  Under the 
price standard, one must describe the industry and identify the values of a 
few underlying parameters to determine how large cost savings would have 
to be to prevent the price from rising or the output from falling.198  This 
task alone is extremely difficult.199  However, an economic efficiency 
standard would be more complex and require much more information.  
Unlike a price (wealth transfer) standard, an efficiency-based approach 
would require the decision maker to also evaluate the potential efficiency 
gains from a merger even after determining that the merger would probably 
lead to an increase in price and a fall in output.  This tradeoff analysis 
would require that one know the firm’s marginal cost and marginal revenue 
schedules over the relevant output ranges,200 in addition to all the 
information needed to analyze a merger under the price standard. 
 
 195. No. 07-CV-2172 BEN (JMA), 2010 WL 3034024 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 03, 2010). 
 196. Id. at *7 (quoting Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433). 
 197. This subsection is based upon Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 2, at 809–13. See 
also Alan A. Fisher, Robert H. Lande & Walter Vandaele, Afterword:  Could a Merger Lead 
to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1697 (1983); Alan Fisher & 
Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580 
(1983), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1701785. 
 198. See Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 2, at 809–13. 
 199. See id. 
 200. To use an economic efficiency criterion, one must examine the effects of changes in 
prices and output levels.  Such model building would be vastly more complex than model 
building for an unchanged output and would also require restrictive (perhaps unrealistic) 
assumptions of the behavior of marginal cost and marginal revenue as output changes.  This 
complexity underlies our finding that the price criterion is simpler and more workable than 
the economic efficiency standard in the context of oligopoly.  For a discussion, see id. 
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The price standard also has an important empirical advantage.  It may 
sometimes be possible to observe after the fact (for a joint venture, for 
example) whether the price rose and output fell.  By contrast, the tradeoff 
under an economic efficiency test—whether marginal costs fell sufficiently 
to offset the adverse effects of reduced output—usually would elude 
hindsight even if prices could be shown to rise. 
Economic efficiency advocates often recognize the administrative 
complexity of their standard and therefore propose a simplified operational 
approximation—an output rule that is virtually identical to the price 
standard!201  Indeed, when the Reagan Administration proposed legislative 
reform of the Clayton Act in 1986, it recommended using an explicit price 
standard to evaluate mergers.202 
An efficiency standard would also need to assess, in those circumstances 
where price increased, the likelihood that the requisite cost savings would 
actually arise.203  Even when a transaction or arrangement will increase 
efficiency, the adjustment could be stormy, and the firms’ marginal costs 
may decline only after a lengthy period.  Moreover, at least one of the firms 
might have achieved comparable efficiency gains through less 
anticompetitive means, such as a licensing arrangement, joint venture, or 
less anticompetitive scenario. 
The tradeoff calculations would typically be complex in practice, 
especially given the creativity of antitrust attorneys and economists.  During 
litigation each side would have experts with very different opinions of the 
appropriate model and values of the parameters.  Each side would try to 
convince or confuse a judge whose training and experience would typically 
be neither in economics nor in business. 
The legal system is far better suited to resolving “either-or” disputes—
will price increase or will it not increase—than to balancing factors in a 
multivariable analysis—will cost savings decrease enough to compensate 
for the allocative inefficiency effects of the higher prices.  This is especially 
 
 201. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31–33 
(1984) (proposing a series of filters in an attempt to ensure that only practices likely to result 
in reduced output or increased prices would be subject to the Rule of Reason); Richard A. 
Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:  Per Se Legality, 
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 21 (1981) (proposing to make a restriction’s effect on output a central 
feature of an assessment of whether it increases competition); Richard A. Posner, The Rule 
of Reason and the Economic Approach:  Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 16–17 (1977) (proposing to determine the permissibility of restrictions on 
distribution by measuring their effects on output). 
 202. The Merger Modernization Act of 1986 proposed changing section 7 of the Clayton 
Act from a ban on mergers “substantially [likely] to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly,” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), to a ban on mergers likely to “increase the ability to 
exercise market power.” S. 2160, 99th Cong. § 2(a) (1986).  The proposed bill defined the 
ability to exercise market power as “the ability of one or more firms profitably to maintain 
prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time.” Id. § 2(d). 
 203. Experts have tended to make grossly inaccurate predictions that, to be accurate,  
must include predictions of how far into the future efficiencies will occur, and an appropriate 
discount rate.  These additional complexities can affect the computations of both efficiency 
gains and inefficiency losses from mergers. See Fisher & Lande, supra 197, at 1619–24. 
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true under the constraints of litigation, which could include preliminary 
injunction settings.204  Indeed, both acquiring firms and the antitrust 
agencies have a poor record in predicting efficiency effects in actual 
cases,205 and the agencies and reviewing courts are likely to make incorrect 
decisions a high percentage of the time. 
III.  WHEN CONSUMER CHOICE CONSIDERATIONS ARE CRUCIAL 
The antitrust statutes are not written in terms of the price effects of 
market power.  They focus instead on more general principles.  Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, for example, is concerned with arrangements in “restraint 
of trade,”206 not arrangements that “lead to higher prices.”  Section 2 
prohibits “monopolization” of “commerce,”207 not “monopoly pricing.”  As 
noted above, a contract, combination, or conspiracy that “restrains” trade 
can merely distort or change it, rather than simply diminish its size or 
quantity.  In other words, a “restraint” of trade also could distort the 
competitive array of offerings in the market, not just the market’s price 
offerings.  A fair reading of the Sherman Act suggests that every aspect of 
competition important to consumers—price, quality, variety, etc.—was 
meant to be the concern of the antitrust statutes.208 
Normally, however, antitrust can simply focus on prices—an approach 
that prevents transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with market 
power—even though non-price competition is often crucial to consumer 
welfare.  This is because normally a market that is price competitive also 
will produce optimal non-price competition.  But this is not always true. 
Suppose the twenty leading media companies—including television 
networks, radio networks, and newspaper chains—all wanted to merge the 
entirety of their news operations.  This surely would lead to tremendous 
cost saving efficiencies in the costs of reporting the news.  But would it lead 
to any price increases?  Perhaps not.  After all, these news operations would 
all be competing for advertising dollars and personnel with many other 
television and radio shows and also with a vast number of internet 
operations.  Price effects would be very difficult to show. 
 
 204. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design 
Choices:  The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534–42 (1973) (discussing 
the notion of “polycentric” decision making in the design defect context).  Professor 
Henderson drew this concept from Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 1 (1960), and M. POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY 170–84 (1951). 
 205. See Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 2, at 783 n.23. 
 206. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 207.  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 208. As noted in DILLON, supra note 96, at 430 n.3 (“A monopoly exists when the sale of 
any merchandise or commodity is restrained to one or to a certain number (11 Co. 86); and it 
has three inseparable consequents,—the increase of the price, the badness of the wares, the 
impoverishment of others.”).  The Case of Monopolies, similarly holds:  “The 2d . . . incident 
to a monopoly is, that after the monopoly granted, the commodity is not so good and 
merchantable as it was before . . . .” Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), [1601] 77 
E.R. 1260, 1263; see also supra note 118. 
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However, in case this combination might produce some price effects, 
also assume that these twenty media companies all agreed with the 
enforcement authorities that if they were allowed to merge, they would not 
raise the price of anything including advertising rates, newspapers, or any 
other priced item.209  Therefore this merger would generate tremendous 
efficiencies but would not lead to any price increases.  Under a price or 
efficiency approach to competition law it should be permitted. 
But it should not be permitted under the consumer choice approach to 
antitrust law, because the most serious harms from this newsgathering 
merger can best be expressed in terms of a loss of the consumer choice that 
the free market otherwise would bring.  This choice can be illustrated by 
perspectives, editorial independence, and the quality and varieties of 
approaches to news coverage.  A choice approach to antitrust would reflect 
these concerns much better than antitrust law centered around price or 
efficiency.  
The Supreme Court recently stressed the importance of non-price 
competition in Leegin, explaining that it is desirable when competition 
gives “consumers more options so that they can choose among low-price, 
low-service brands; high-price, high-service brands; and brands that fall in 
between.”210  There are a large number and variety of cases that cannot be 
explained just by a quest for efficiency or low prices.  The best way to 
analyze and explain these cases is in terms of consumer choice.211 
With this as background, the remainder of this section will first define the 
consumer choice approach to competition law—what it means, including 
how it differs from the efficiency or price approaches, and how it often is 
embodied in current U.S. decisions.  Second, this section will discuss 
specific types of situations where a consumer choice focus makes or would 
make a difference.  In every case it would produce better results than the 
efficiency or price approaches. 
A.  What Is the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law? 
If you examine every type of antitrust law violation—from price fixing to 
predation—and ask what they have in common, the answer is that they all 
significantly restrict consumer choice.  They all significantly and artificially 
distort or diminish the choices that otherwise would be offered by the free 
market.  Three brief examples are:  (1) cartels, which certainly do this, by 
replacing the price and non-price options that should result from 
competition, by price and non-price terms set by collusion; (2) mergers that 
 
 209. Also assume that all twenty companies also agreed not to lower the wages they paid 
their employees.  For this reason the merger would not lead to monopsony concerns. 
 210. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007). 
 211. In addition to the examples in this Article that document the use of the consumer 
choice approach to antitrust law, see Averitt & Lande, supra note 10, at 196–237, and Neil 
W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty:  A Unified Theory of Antitrust and 
Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 713–22 (1997), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134798. 
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lead to market power; and (3) monopolization by predation, which also 
leads to fewer price and non-price choices than the free market would offer.  
In fact, every antitrust law or competition law violation distorts consumer 
choices.212 
You might now wonder how a consumer choice approach differs from 
either a price approach or an efficiency approach?  It includes both.  It 
includes price considerations because price is almost always an important 
choice variable for consumers.  It also includes efficiency because 
efficiencies can affect choices, especially in the long run. 
But, crucially, the choice approach also includes a heightened concern 
with every significant non-price dimension of competition that consumers 
care about.  In theory these factors are supposed to be considered under 
every approach.  But as a practical matter, under a price or efficiency 
approach, factors such as service, innovation, quality, privacy, and variety 
are as a practical matter sometimes relegated to the footnotes of the 
analysis, where they are too often forgotten.  The consumer choice 
approach, by contrast, in effect moves non-price issues up into the text 
where they play a much more prominent role in the analysis and result.  
Near the end of this Article, the evolution of the U.S. Merger Guidelines 
will illustrate the differing emphases that have been given to choice issues 
over time. 
There are other crucial elements of a consumer choice approach that 
should be stressed.  First, not every decrease in consumer choice counts as 
an injury to competition.  Only significant decreases count, which would 
not include, for example, a reduction from ten choices down to nine!  
Second, more choice is not necessarily good, because too much choice can 
cause confusion and can as a practical matter mean that costs increase 
unduly.213  For this reason, the goal of competition policy should not be to 
maximize consumer choice.  Rather, it should be to eliminate practices that 
artificially restrict the choices that the free market would have provided.  
Third, as noted earlier, every competition law violation reduces consumer 
choice, but the converse is not true.  It is not true that every reduction in 
consumer choice is a competition law violation.  Some reductions in 
consumer choice—such as when a monopolist reduces its variety of 
offerings—do not violate any law.  Other reductions in choice are consumer 
protection violations.214 
B.  When Would the Consumer Choice Approach Make a Difference? 
At this point you might well be thinking that of course competition law 
should be concerned about more than just price.  You might say that non-
price issues should certainly count and should count heavily.  But, if a 
market is competitive in terms of price, won’t it also be competitive in 
 
 212. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 211, at 718–20. 
 213. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 10, at 184 n.23, 191–95.  
 214. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 211, at 720–22.  
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terms of non-price issues?  For example, if a market has four firms, and if 
four firms are enough to have optimal price competition, won’t these same 
four firms also insure optimal non-price competition?  If so, is there a 
reason to not just use a price standard?  Won’t a price focus automatically 
give us optimal non-price competition as well? 
Normally, it would indeed.  Normally there is no difference between a 
choice approach and a price approach and therefore little benefit to using a 
choice standard.215 
But at other times the choice approach would make a significant 
difference in both the analysis and the result.  The remainder of this section 
will analyze specific cases and categories of cases where a choice analysis 
would make a significant difference and where the choice analysis and 
result would be superior. 
1.  Cases in Markets with Little or No Price Competition 
The first category of cases involves conduct in markets with little or no 
price competition.  This could occur as a result of regulation, of industry 
wide joint ventures, or third-party payers.  In these situations there is no 
way to properly assess consumer welfare without focusing explicitly on 
non-price issues. 
An example from the United States involves airlines back when their 
prices were regulated.  During this period, airlines still competed in terms 
of service.216  Suppose that every U.S. airline had wanted to merge during 
this period.  Why not allow these mergers?  Prices were regulated and could 
not increase.  Moreover, there might have been efficiencies from the 
mergers.  The reason the airlines were not allowed to merge is that we 
wanted these airlines to engage in non-price competition, specifically, in 
service competition. 
In fact, similar mergers were allowed on these grounds involving the 
market for taxicabs in Montgomery County, Maryland, an area very close to 
Washington, D.C.  The local regulators allowed every major taxicab 
company to merge because their prices were regulated.217  How could there 
possibly have been any harm from these mergers?  As one could predict, 
the quality of taxicab service went down significantly because the mergers 
created a near monopoly.  Consumers suffered a harm that could not be 
picked up by a price or cost savings analysis. 
Another important example is the FTC’s recent Realcomp II case.218  
This involved a conspiracy among established full-service, high-priced real 
estate brokers to eliminate real estate brokers that provided only some 
 
 215. Even for these situations, however, the consumer choice terminology is a better way 
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specific brokerage services, but did so for a much lower price.  The FTC 
and the reviewing court held that consumers were entitled to have the low-
cost, low-service option.  It was not acceptable for the real estate broker 
cartel to only provide the full-service, high-cost option.  Even though there 
was no evidence that the price of any real estate service increased, the court 
held that the conspiracy to eliminate choices from the marketplace violated 
the FTC Act.219 
2.  Conduct That Impairs Consumers’ Decision-Making Ability 
A second category of cases when a consumer choice approach is superior 
involves conduct that increases consumers’ search costs or otherwise 
impairs their decision-making ability.  This conduct causes consumers to 
obtain products or services less suited to their needs, in addition to 
producing higher prices.  There are a large number of cases that have 
involved restrictions on advertising by lawyers, dentists, opticians, 
engineers, etc. 
In each of these cases the prices of the services in question—legal, 
dental, optical, etc.—increased as a result of the advertising restrictions.  
This was, of course, the purpose of the restraints.  In addition, the 
prohibitions against advertising also made it hard for consumers to choose 
the service that best suited their needs.  Consumers were also harmed by 
their inability to select the engineer, lawyer, or optician that was optimal for 
them. 
Efficiencies were claimed for all the practices.  Naturally!  Depending 
upon the case, the efficiencies were more believable or less believable. 
Most of these advertising restrictions were evaluated under the rule of 
reason.  This rule states that the negative effects of the restrictions—both 
the higher prices and the diminished consumer choice—should be balanced 
against the practices’ efficiencies.  The balance easily could come out 
differently if only the price effects were included on the negative side of the 
tradeoff.  However, a tradeoff that also included the negative effects on 
consumer choice (resulting from consumers’ inability to find the best 
lawyer, engineer, etc., for their purposes) would more accurately reflect the 
effects of the restrictions on consumer welfare.  
Another notable consumer search cost case, Detroit Auto Dealers 
Ass’n,220 involved a conspiracy by every automobile dealer in a large 
metropolitan area to essentially stay open for business only from nine to 
five on weekdays.221  This led to higher prices for automobiles.  The 
decreased shopping time also caused consumers to purchase cars less 
suitable for their needs. 
 
 219. Id. at *44. 
 220. In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 111 F.T.C. 417 (1989). 
 221. There were, however, exceptions to this prohibition.  For an analysis of this case, see 
Averitt & Lande, supra note 10, at 200–01. 
 2396 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
In Detroit Auto Dealers—or in any of the vast majority of consumers’ 
search cost cases that are decided under the rule of reason—the non-price 
harms to consumers should also be included, in addition to the price harms.  
Their combination should be weighed against any efficiencies from the 
practices.  In practice, adding the non-price harms often could make a 
crucial difference in the outcome. 
3.  Markets Where Firms Primarily Compete Through Choice Competition 
The final category of cases involves markets in which firms compete 
primarily through independent product development, quality, variety, and 
creativity, rather than through price.  Effective competition in these 
industries may sometimes require more independent centers of decision 
making than are required to ensure price competition.  Market concentration 
principles taken from a price context may not ensure robust competition in 
the ways that are most important to consumers.  In these cases we care 
about artificially diminished consumer choice—even if prices are 
competitive.  For this reason, in these markets a price standard is simply 
inadequate.   
The media surely is an area where we care a lot about independent 
judgment, independent decision making, and creativity.  It is possible to 
further analyze examples from this industry by contrasting them to a more 
conventional example of a merger of cookie companies.  Suppose there 
were only four firms that made cookies, that two of them wanted to merge, 
and that three firms would be enough to yield effective price competition.  
If consumers want 20 or 200 different types of cookies, the remaining three 
firms would supply them.  For this hypothetical four-to-three merger there 
would be no advantage to using a choice standard over a price standard or 
an efficiency standard.  The reason is that the owners of the cookie 
companies do not care which cookies their customers eat, so they will 
produce whatever kinds of cookies that consumers desire. 
But this might not always apply in the media sector.  The media owners 
might have distinct preferences concerning the editorial slant of the news.  
Within limits, they may be able to slant their content or coverage.  
Moreover, the media owners might have unconscious biases and 
presuppositions, so even if they have the best intentions they might not be 
able to supply the full range of views.  While companies easily can make all 
different types of cookies, it is much more difficult to hold all sorts of 
different worldviews. 
Another area with special choice concerns is high technology, where 
innovation is especially crucial.  It is virtually meaningless to try to use a 
price standard to evaluate the effects of a merger or joint venture on future 
technology, since by definition that future technology does not yet exist.  
For cases in the defense, pharmaceutical, computer, or other high-tech 
sectors, to ensure the optimal level of future consumer choice we want 
divergent sources of current innovation.  In other words, in some markets, 
competition in terms of consumer choice (in terms of innovation, ideas, 
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quality, privacy and/or variety) can be even more important than 
competition in terms of price or cost savings. 
There certainly have been high-tech cases where this concern with 
choices seems to have affected the analysis and the ultimate decision.  For 
example, there have been mergers in the pharmaceutical industry where the 
FTC seemed to require one more firm to innovate than normally would 
have been required simply for price competition.222  There have also been 
defense sector mergers where the U.S. Justice Department appears to have 
required, for the sake of optimal innovation, one more firm than usual.223 
C.  Implementation Issues 
Antitrust cannot consider adopting a goal unless it can be implemented in 
a relatively objective, predictable manner.  How does the choice approach 
compare to the other possible goals by this criteria?  What are the guiding 
principles for determining how much weight to give to significant decreases 
in consumer choice?  How can we conduct the analysis relatively 
objectively? 
Mergers might be the easiest place to discuss implementation issues.224  
As a practical matter, how would we implement these consumer choice 
concerns, especially in a sector like the media, high technology, 
entertainment, or fashion, where choice concerns might be especially 
important?  In three possible ways: 
(1) As a tie-breaker or plus factor.  If we were deciding the legality of a 
media merger, for example, and if we were just on the margin if we only 
considered price effects, choice considerations should cause us to 
challenge the merger. 
(2) As an implicit factor that would operate within the current structure of 
the Merger Guidelines and would, as an informal matter, give 
discretionary weight to non-price choice considerations in the enforcers’ 
analysis.  Suppose that for industries where price competition was most 
important, the enforcers would challenge twenty percent of above-
Guideline mergers.  But perhaps for those industries where consumer 
choice issues were especially crucial—for mergers involving sectors such 
as the media, entertainment, or fashion—the enforcers would block forty 
percent of above-Guideline mergers.  To implement choice concerns this 
way, as an informal matter of the enforcers’ discretion, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) levels in the Guidelines would not be changed.  
But the Guidelines would be enforced more vigorously whenever choice 
competition was especially important. 
(3)  Change the Merger Guidelines and make choice analysis a separate 
explicit factor in the merger review process.  Under this approach, a 
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merger should be challenged either if it was likely to lead to higher prices, 
or if it was likely to lead to significantly less consumer choice because the 
merger was likely to lead to less innovation (the most important factor 
that determines consumer choice in the long run). 
The merger investigation would make a separate, high-priority inquiry 
into both the price and the innovation effects of the merger.  This inquiry 
could lead to a different result from a price-based inquiry, especially 
because not every company within an industry competes substantially 
through innovation.  Some firms instead largely compete by making 
existing products less expensively, by superior marketing, by superior 
service, etc.  This would be somewhat different from attempting to predict 
whether a particular merger would lead to more or to less innovation.  
Rather, it would mean attempting to ascertain whether particular firms 
historically had been centers of independent innovation. 
Here is how this inquiry could work.  Suppose that a high tech industry 
consists of five firms: firms A, B, C, D, and E.  Suppose we also believe that 
three firms are enough to have effective price competition, and also that 
three firms is enough for effective innovation competition.  But suppose 
that only firms A, B, and C compete significantly by innovating, that only 
these three firms have large R & D budgets, and that only these three have a 
history of making significant innovations.  Suppose that Firm D competes 
in other ways—perhaps it is an imitator that makes existing products less 
expensively, and suppose that firm E historically only competes through 
superior marketing. 
Suppose that firms A and B (two of the firms that compete by innovating) 
want to merge.  Under price analysis we should permit this merger.  This is 
because after the merger there would still be four firms left, and we have 
stipulated that three is enough for effective price competition.  But under 
choice analysis we should block this merger because it is likely to lead to 
less innovation, the long term source of optimal consumer choice. 
Accordingly, regardless of the number of firms we believe is necessary 
for effective price competition, and even if we believe that the same number 
of firms will suffice for choice competition in every industry, choice 
analysis sometimes could lead to tougher merger enforcement.225 
D.  An Example of the Increasing Use of Choice Analysis:  
The Evolution of the U.S. Merger Guidelines 
A striking and encouraging example of the increasing role of consumer 
choice analysis in U.S. antitrust law can be found by observing the 
increased importance of this subject in the Merger Guidelines.  The 1992 
edition barely mentions non-price competition.  An introductory section 
 
 225. This is analogous to unilateral effects analysis, which essentially says that we should 
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titled “Purpose and Underlying Policy Assumptions of the Guidelines,”226 
contains a dozen references in the text to “price,” the “transfer of wealth 
from buyers to sellers,” and similar monetary concepts.227  Only a single 
footnote suggests that merger policy includes non-price concerns.228 
The 1992 Merger Guidelines thus technically permit consideration of 
non-price elements of competition, but the document is structured in such a 
way as not to particularly encourage this analysis.  It is possible that non-
price competition might have been intended to be captured in the 
Guidelines’ use of the term “price” which could have been meant to be used 
in the manner that economists often use this term:  price that has been 
adjusted for quality, or “price” as a shorthand for both price and non-price 
attributes.  The Guidelines did not, however, state this.  Regardless, the 
1992 Guidelines were not structured to encourage this approach or to 
suggest that choice considerations were a high priority. 
By contrast, the 2010 Merger Guidelines have warmly embraced a 
consumer choice approach:  section 1, the Overview, after noting that 
mergers can have price effects, states: 
Enhanced market power can also be manifested in non-price terms and 
conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product 
quality, reduced product variety, reduced service, or diminished 
innovation.  Such non-price effects may coexist with price effects, or can 
arise in their absence.  When the Agencies investigate whether a merger 
may lead to a substantial lessening of non-price competition, they employ 
an approach analogous to that used to evaluate price competition.229 
Moreover, the 2010 Guidelines contain a new section, section 6.4, titled 
“Innovation and Product Variety”: 
Competition often spurs firms to innovate.  The Agencies may consider 
whether a merger is likely to diminish innovation competition by 
encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the 
level that would prevail in the absence of the merger.  That curtailment of 
innovation could take the form of reduced incentive to continue with an 
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existing product-development effort or reduced incentive to initiate 
development of new products.230 
This section also makes the importance of non-price competition clear: 
The Agencies also consider whether a merger is likely to give the merged 
firm an incentive to cease offering one of the relevant products sold by the 
merging parties.  Reductions in variety following a merger may or may 
not be anticompetitive.  Mergers can lead to the efficient consolidation of 
products when variety offers little in value to customers.  In other cases, a 
merger may increase variety by encouraging the merged firm to reposition 
its products to be more differentiated from one another. 
 If the merged firm would withdraw a product that a significant number 
of  customers strongly prefer to those products that would remain 
available, this can constitute a harm to customers over and above any 
effects on the price or quality of any given product.  If there is evidence of 
such an effect, the Agencies may inquire whether the reduction in variety 
is largely due to a loss of competitive incentives attributable to the 
merger.231 
Even the 2010 Merger Guidelines’ Efficiencies section, which mostly is 
worded in cost terms, clearly makes non-price competition a high priority: 
[A] primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to 
generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s 
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ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, 
improved quality, enhanced service, or new products . . . . 
 Efficiencies also may lead to new or improved products, even if they 
do not immediately and directly affect price . .  . . 
 When evaluating the effects of a merger on innovation, the Agencies 
consider the ability of the merged firm to conduct research or 
development more effectively.  Such efficiencies may spur innovation but 
not affect short-term pricing.232 
The decisions embodied in the 2010 Merger Guidelines to make choice 
competition a vastly higher priority are a most welcome advance over the 
1992 approach.  Perhaps for the reasons given earlier in this article, the new 
Merger Guidelines recognize that a concern with price and efficiency often 
are insufficient and that the approach of the 1992 Merger Guidelines—
mention non-price competition only in a footnote—is inadequate.  Choice 
considerations are finally receiving the respect they are due. 
E.  Concluding Example:  The Microsoft Case 
The final example was analyzed and decided under a consumer choice 
approach and could not have been analyzed well or decided correctly under 
a price or efficiency approach.  This was the most highly publicized U.S. 
antitrust case of the last generation—the Microsoft case.233 
The primary products in question were personal computer operating 
systems and browsers.  The focus of the parties’ briefs and the court 
decisions was on innovation, new products, and short term and long term 
consumer choice.  In contrast, the briefs and decisions paid little attention to 
the price of anything.  After all, the price of the operating systems was not 
an issue because Microsoft had a legal monopoly on it.  The price of the 
browser was not an issue because Microsoft was giving it away for free (in 
fact, trying its best to give it to everyone for free).  Nor were cost saving 
efficiencies a significant concern.234 
Rather, short-term consumer choices, and also innovation and the 
resulting long term choices innovation could bring, were the key concerns.  
Naturally, both sides disagreed strongly about how to maximize consumer 
choice.  But the important point is that consumer choice was—and should 
have been—the focus of the case.  By contrast, cost savings and price 
were—and should have been—much lower concerns.235 
The Microsoft case illustrates two important points.  First, antitrust law 
has long been in the process of moving from an efficiency or price approach 
toward a choice approach, even if many cases do not explicitly use the 
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choice terminology.  Second, a price or efficiency orientation often is 
inadequate to address many of our most important competition-related 
concerns. 
Both Microsoft and the hypothetical involving the huge media merger 
presented at the beginning of this Article illustrate that the choice approach 
often will lead to a better analysis and a better outcome.  The choice 
approach should be the normal way to analyze competition issues. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS:  HONESTY AND TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT 
It is interesting to contemplate some possible antitrust laws our country 
did not enact: 
(1)  We could have prevented firms from entering into “any contract, 
combination, or conspiracy that is inefficient.” 
(2)  We could have prohibited, “inefficient methods of competition.” 
(3)  We could have prohibited mergers that may lessen competition or 
tend to create a monopoly, but added as an explicit exception, “unless that 
merger produces an efficient monopoly.” 
(4)  We could have made it illegal to monopolize or attempt to 
monopolize, and added an explicit exception for a monopoly attained by 
superior efficiency or historical accident. 
(5)  We could have worded the antitrust statutes in price terms.  We could 
have prohibited “monopoly pricing” and the “price effects of collusion,” 
rather than using such general terms as restraints of “trade” and 
monopolization of “commerce,” terms that suggests both price and non-
price concerns. 
(6)  If we had wanted to encourage those corporations existing when the 
Sherman Act was passed that were most efficient, we could have enacted 
a “protrust” law rather than an “antitrust law,” whose preamble praised 
Standard Oil and the other trusts. 
We never enacted any of efficiency-oriented laws.  Nevertheless, the 
efficiency purist enforcer hypothesized at the beginning of this article could 
easily obfuscate or conceal what they were doing and enforce the existing 
laws in a manner that only maximized economic efficiency.  Some previous 
real enforcement heads might well have done this.  This would not, 
however, be a principled way to run a government.  Government officials 
should be honest and transparent about the policies they are pursuing, and if 
the voters do not like this, they can elect new leaders. 
To those who would implement an efficiency-only approach, I urge you 
to be proudly clear about what you are doing.  Say candidly:  “I think this 
merger will raise prices to consumers by 20 percent, and this cartel will 
raise prices by 300 percent.  This means consumers will pay an additional 
$50 million to $100 million each year, all of which will enrich the 
monopoly and the cartel.  That is fine with me because the merger and the 
collusion are net efficient.”  If, however, you would not proudly and clearly 
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say these things, I submit that you should not embrace the efficiency 
approach to antitrust. 
It is entirely understandable that many passionately wish the antitrust 
statutes’ only goal was to enhance efficiency.  Many consider this best for 
our economy, so they would like to interpret these laws in the ways they 
believe are optimal.  This is understandable.  But surely the Occupy Wall 
Street types would reason similarly if they ever got into power.  Could a 
1960s style “big is bad” approach ever return to antitrust?  Or should we 
prevent this possibility by accurately adhering to the laws that Congress 
enacted? 
It is difficult to believe that Congress in 1890 passed the Sherman Act 
because of its concern with the allocative inefficiency effects of 
supracompetitive pricing or that efficiency was Congress’s sole goal in 
1914 when it enacted the Clayton Act and the FTC Act.  Rather, both a 
traditional examination of the legislative history of the antitrust laws and a 
textualist analysis of the antitrust statutes demonstrate the primacy of the 
wealth transfer concern.  The antitrust statutes are supposed to prevent 
corporations from using their market power to force consumers to pay 
supracompetitive prices.  We could politely call this a concern with the 
wealth transfer effects of market power.  Or we could bluntly, but 
accurately, characterize these as situations where the firms are stealing from 
consumers. 
To be complete, we should add that sometimes we have to focus 
explicitly on consumer choice (non-price) terms, sometimes we must take 
into account that the purchasers who need protection are businesses or 
indirect purchasers, and sometimes we should be concerned with protecting 
sellers from wealth transfers to powerful buyers with market power.  But 
these are the exceptions.  Usually, in fact, we can simply use a price 
approach to antitrust and remain faithful to Congress’s wishes.  Moreover, 
according to a textualist analysis, the Sherman Act contains no other 
exceptions.  It prohibits all private monopoly, not just monopolies acquired 
by anticompetitive conduct. 
As former Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton once 
said, “An outside idea has a chance to influence government policy only if 
it has two characteristics.  First, it can be stated in a simple declarative 
sentence.  Second, once stated it is obviously true.”236  The “wealth 
transfer” or “preventing theft” articulation of the primary goal of antitrust 
qualifies on both counts.  In addition, it is perhaps midway between what 
Tea Party adherents would desire and what the Occupy Wall Street 
protesters would settle for.  It is also the best hope for U.S./European—
indeed for worldwide—convergence around a single goal for competition 
policy.  It has the best chance of constituting a compromise we could all 
accept. 
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